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"I WANT TO TELL YOU WHAT I DID AND WHY I DID IT."
A RHETORICAL CRITICISM OF THE CRISIS RHETORIC OF
PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

Barbara Jen Chandler
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Supervisor: Dr. Deborah Smith-Howell

This study examines the rhetoric o f President George Bush as he addressed four
crisis situations during his term in office—The Panama Invasion in December 1989, the
Flag Desecration issue in June 1990, the Persian Gulf War in August 1990 and the Los
Angeles riots in April 1992. The discourse was analyzed to discover characteristics o f his
crisis communication rhetorical style and strategy, and to determine whether his crisis
communication supported the arguments for a crisis rhetoric genre.
Bush’s style and strategy were examined in terms of the rhetorical elements of
speaker, audience, topic and setting. The analysis revealed that Bush used personal
values to establish himself as the legitimate leader of the nation. He used patriotic,
religious, social and family values to establish common ground with his audiences and
focus the topics of his remarks.

Bush’s crisis rhetoric provided evidence in support o f a crisis rhetoric genre
theory. His remarks followed a consistent, identifiable pattern and contained elements
necessary in crisis discourse in order for audiences to understand and evaluate the crisis
situations and the actions chosen by the president to resolve those situations. Such genre
elements include evidence of consummatory and/or justificatory language, the speaker’s
awareness o f a global audience, explanations of how the actions are in accordance with
U.S. policies and how they are strategically sound and morally upright, justification of
action based on audience values, and evidence o f enemy themes in the discourse.
The study provides insight into the rhetorical style o f George Bush and offers a
framework for similar studies o f other presidential crisis rhetoric. It also presents specific
criteria for the crisis rhetoric genre which can be applied to future study o f this
communication issue.
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C H A PTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"We interrupt this program to bring you a special news bulletin." Those words
immediately draw the attention of any adult within earshot of a television or radio.
Questions race through people's minds as they prepare to receive the information. What
is so important? Is it good news or bad? Is it a crisis? I f it is, who is in charge? Is the
news local, national or international? When did it happen? Who will speak? From
where? What action will need to be taken? What decisions will need to be made?
As the speaker begins to relay the late-breaking news, listeners filter the
information through their mental storehouses o f past experiences concerning news
bulletins. Through that filtering process, they answer the questions and assign a level of
importance to the news bulletin.
Perhaps it is a story about a bank robbery on the other side o f town. The
questions are answered: it is local news; probably not a crisis; the spokesperson will
probably be someone from the police department. The listeners are dependent on that
person for information that will help them decide who is in charge, whether the news
affects them personally and whether they need to take any action or make a decision.
Perhaps the news bulletin is a story about a hurricane in Florida. People who do
not live in the southeast probably do not need to take any action. They anticipate regular
updates from someone in the National Weather Service, and they expect local Florida
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officials to alert them, through the media, if victims o f the hurricane need money, food or
clothing that people living in other parts of the country might be able to provide.
A news bulletin about student protests on several college campuses alerts the
public to an issue that may have national implications. It may become a crisis. People
tune in to the news for updated information. They expect comments from university
officials. They wait to see if any government officials address the situation. If so, the
listeners measure the seriousness o f the situation by whether they are city, state or
national government officials.
If the news is about an international incident, such as a highjacking or a military
action that threatens peace, people have certain expectations about who will speak and
what will be said. They anticipate a national government spokesperson, and the public
perception based on past experience is that the more powerful the position o f the
spokesperson, the more important the news is likely to be. If there is a statement from the
White House, people wait to see who will deliver it. If the spokesperson is a White
House aide or the Press Secretary, a certain level of seriousness is attached to the
situation. If the statement is delivered by a cabinet member, the public knows that the
news is more serious. If the President o f the United States comes to the podium to
deliver news to the American people, they know that it is a high priority situation and
their attention is trained on the voice o f the nation's most powerful leader.
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All of the hypothetical situations described above have one thing in common.
They all fit prescribed scripts that people have become familiar with, through past
experience, as the way they receive and filter news information about unexpected
situations. People have certain expectations about how they will receive information
during a crisis and what will be said. These situations clearly fit the conditions that Lloyd
F. Bitzer uses to describe rhetorical situations (1). According to Bitzer, a rhetorical
situation involves an exigence1 —an imperfection marked by urgency that invites
discourse (6). In addition, a rhetorical situation requires that the discourse be delivered to
an audience capable of being influenced by that discourse and taking action accordingly
(8), and the discourse must fit the situation (10). In other words, in a rhetorical situation
something must be wrong that can be remedied if a speaker can persuade the listeners to
support the leadership's chosen solution. However, such persuasive discourse must be
crafted very carefully if it is to achieve its goal. The speaker must have a clear
understanding of the interaction o f all the elements involved in the situation, including
the topic, the setting and the audience. The speaker must decide what effect the speech
may have on the audience. Will it be calming or challenging? Will it be demanding or
placating? Will the speaker inspire the listeners or warn them (Hart, Modem Rhetorical
69-70)?

The discourse must fit the situation (Bitzer 10). For example, if an announcement
about the deployment of U.S. troops to a war zone was delivered from a fishing boat, it
would not be a fitting response because the setting is not in line with public expectations
for such an announcement. Similarly, when Ronald Reagan was scheduled to deliver the
State o f the Union address and the Challenger Space Shuttle exploded, he changed the
topic o f his speech that evening and gave a eulogy. It would not have been fitting to
deliver any other type o f speech under the circumstances. It is very important for
presidents to consider their decisions very carefully when preparing fitting responses to
exigencies because the one thing they can be sure of is that when the president speaks, the
people listen.
The presidency, as an institution, commands the attention o f the nation, and
therefore, so does the person holding that office. Several scholars have discussed why
presidential discourse receives such attention. They suggest that the public tries to
resolve uncertainty and the need for information during a crisis by attending to the words
o f the legitimately elected leader of the nation. In other words, when people recognize
that a crisis situation is at hand that requires a response, they look to the president for
leadership and direction .
In Political Campaign Communication. Judith S. Trent and Robert V.
Friedenberg's discussion about the characteristics of the presidency offers some
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explanation as to why presidential statements are the focus of audience attention during
crisis situations. One such characteristic is simply the legitimacy o f the office of
president. The person who holds the office is perceived as the natural and logical leader
o f the nation (Trent and Friedenberg 66). A crisis occurs suddenly from the perspective
o f average citizens who may be uncertain as to the appropriate reaction, so people depend
on government officials to provide meaning to the event (Young 272). Public
uncertainty, particularly in a crisis situation, makes people anxious to hear the president's
version o f what is happening. People need to know as much as possible about the
situation in order to determine their own opinions and courses of action. The president
has access to virtually every possible source of information so the public perception is
that the most credible information they will be able to get will come from the president.
Another basis for public attention to the president is the characteristic of
competency. The president has the power to take almost any action, and people want to
believe that the person they elected president is capable o f fulfilling that role (Trent and
Friedenberg 66). The basic tendency o f Americans is to believe in great personages who
can and will cope with major crises (Cronin 34). Within American society, the
presidency fulfills that need (Denton and Woodward 212).
Clearly, people are primed to listen to presidents in crisis situations, and modem
history has offered many opportunities for presidents to speak. Domestic and
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international crisis situations in recent history include the Vietnam War, the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the assassinations o f President Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Robert Kennedy, the nuclear explosion at Three Mile Island, Kent State, civil rights
demonstrations that erupted into violence, numerous airplane highjacking and terrorist
actions including the capture of American hostages in the Middle East, the explosion of
the Challenger Space Shuttle, and the Persian Gulf War to name just a few Every one of
these situations demanded a response. People expected to receive updated information
about the situation from the White House. In most o f these situations, presidents used the
power o f the office to take action and used the power o f rhetoric to persuade the
American public to support that action or decision.
Asking the American public to support actions like the deployment o f military
troops or to support decisions to negotiate with terrorists requires highly effective
rhetorical skills. Even then, other factors such as economic issues or the actions o f other
nations can interfere with efforts to persuade the public to trust presidential decisions.
Roderick P. Hart suggests that the American people did not re-elect "a pleasant fellow
like Jimmy Carter because he could not persuade them that he could persuade them"
(Verbal Style and the Presidency 6). Somehow, Carter failed to convince the public that
he was a legitimate and competent leader who could handle the nation's crisis situations,
but other presidents have been very successful at winning the public trust in their crisis
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decisions. What factors contributed to that public confidence? Were there rhetorical
strategies employed by some presidents that affected public acceptance o f their decisions
and courses o f action?
In this thesis, I explore the role that rhetorical strategy and style plays in
presidential crisis communication. I examine not only the text o f presidential speeches
made during crisis situations, but also the context of the situation in which those speeches
were delivered. Understanding the structure and content o f crisis discourse as well as the
situations in which it occurred contributes to the knowledge o f the institution o f the
presidency and provides information about effective communication concerning events
that threaten the stability o f the nation.
Previous research in presidential crisis communication has focused almost entirely
on international situations (Kiewe 95-96). I continue the study o f international crises in
this thesis because previous studies raise controversy over whether crisis communication
is a genre. However, in addition to international crises, I examine presidential
communication concerning domestic crises that have occurred in the United States to see
if presidents handle crises in their own back yard differently than that which occurs in
foreign neighborhoods.
The study o f the crisis rhetoric of presidents also provides insight into the
rhetorical style o f the individuals holding the office at any given time. Crisis
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communication has been part o f the rhetorical role o f American presidents ever since the
institution o f the presidency was established and the personalities who held that office
have become historic legends. Men like Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin
Roosevelt and John Kennedy were praised for their rhetorical skills. In fact, a study of
the crisis rhetoric o f any o f America's presidents would yield valuable information about
the office and about the individual elected to the office.
For this thesis, I focus on the crisis rhetoric of President George Bush, who held
office from 1988 through 1992. George Bush was president at an extraordinary time in
history. The Cold War ended and people stopped seeing Communism as a major threat to
the western world. Ever since Truman, presidents have been using Communism to define
the enemy and using nuclear war to define the ultimate crisis.4 During his term o f office,
George Bush had to redefine the enemy and the crisis.
In addition, George Bush's rhetoric is interesting to study because he rode into
office on the tide of popularity created by Ronald Reagan, who was called by many the
"Great Communicator" (Jamieson, Eloquence x). Yet Bush was unable to be elected to a
second term as president. Although this thesis does not attempt to measure the influence
the voting public attaches to presidential crisis rhetoric, nor does it confirm or disprove
that the responses to major news events will make or break a president, it does examine
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the relationship between specific presidential crisis communication and relevant public
opinion polls.
The presidential crisis communication o f George Bush is locked into history along
with the events that prompted it. What he said is on record in the Public Papers of the
Presidents to be studied by anyone interested in presidential communication and the
history o f that time. The speeches in those volumes are like a gallery o f paintings,
completed and hung in place in a particular order. Just as the art critic carefully examines
each detail of a painting to discover information about the artist's style as well as the
message the artist was attempting to convey, as a rhetorical critic I examine the detail of
George Bush's rhetoric to better understand his speaking style as well as the messages he
attempted to convey.
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Examination o f the relevant literature concerning presidential crisis
communication reveals a broad range o f approaches. In addition to various definitions o f
"crisis," some scholars discuss the power of crisis rhetoric to define reality and others
focus on how presidents use crisis rhetoric to persuade and even manipulate the public.
There are also various studies on presidential rhetorical strategies during crises, and
several scholars have taken a generic approach to the topic.

Definition of rhetoric
A discussion o f crisis rhetoric must begin with a definition o f the word "rhetoric."
Rhetoric is the nonverbal and verbal symbols used in the communication process by
speakers and writers, listeners and readers (Golden, Bergquist, Coleman 2). Rhetoric
includes everything from speeches to architecture to dance to public demonstrations.
Rhetoric does not include natural objects and events, such as rock formations or
hurricanes because they are independent o f human communication (Foss 4). Rhetoric is
transactional human communication and can only take place when at least two people
agree to engage in the communication process.
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Rhetoric involves people interacting in an atmosphere of potential change (Hart,
Modem Rhetorical Criticism 9), and using language to help people narrow their choices
(4). Because rhetoric involves making choices, it is also the art o f persuasion. It is the
use o f symbols to influence thought and action (Foss 4). Speakers use rhetoric to
persuade audiences to agree with them, buy their products, support their plans o f action,
vote for them, in short, to take action that furthers the purposes of the speaker.
Aristotle wrote that the function of rhetoric is "not to [absolutely] persuade, but to
discover the available means o f persuasion in a given case" (Cooper 6). In other words, it
is not enough for rhetors to just speak. Each case has its own unique nuances that make
one rhetorical strategy more persuasive than any other and speakers must examine all the
possible means o f persuasion when crafting their rhetoric.
Clearly, political communication is rhetoric. It involves speakers and listeners,
writers and readers. It involves leaders trying to persuade and people trying to make
choices about what action to take. Those choices are most difficult and most urgent in
crisis situations and presidents, particularly in this age of modem media, must be wellprepared to present their most persuasive rhetoric (Kiewe, xvi).
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Definition of crisis
Political communication scholars who discuss crisis rhetoric must first define
what constitutes a crisis. In Political Language. Murray Edelman describes a crisis as "a
development that is unique and threatening" (44), and in Constructing the Political
Spectacle he adds that a crisis "heralds instability" (31). Edelman's choice o f words
suggests that a crisis is any situation in which people feel unsafe and are unsure about a
proper course o f action. These are relatively ambiguous terms that could be applied
equally well to personal or national crises.
Hart takes a national crisis approach. He discusses crises in terms o f the word
"strife" and defines such communication as "speeches describing domestic and
international conflicts such as Vietnam, the Middle East and nuclear disarmament"
(Verbal Style 22). These examples involve military action and it is likely that most
people would agree that any situation involving the potential for loss o f life is a crisis.
In his introduction to The Modem Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric. Amos Kiewe
defines presidential crisis rhetoric as a transactional communication process between the
president, the press, and the public (xvii). In that same book, in an article entitled
"Richard Nixon and the Personalization of Crisis," Carole Blair and Davis W. Houck
define presidential crisis rhetoric as "...an entreaty by a president to the nation to see itself
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as seriously and immediately threatened..." (Blair and Houck 99). They go on to note that
such threats may come from other nations, from individuals or from circumstances.
These definitions of rhetoric and crisis illustrate the broad scope o f presidential
crisis communication, and there is an equally broad range of approaches for studying
crisis communication.

Crisis rhetoric as a way to define reality
Several examples of crisis communication research focus on rhetoric as a way to
define a crisis and thereby, define reality for that situation (Bitzer 4, Foss 4). When
presidents are presented with crisis situations, they must weigh all the information and
determine how to present it to the public. The way that presidents choose to speak about
events is influenced by their backgrounds, personal values and their own expectations o f
how events should proceed. The people who determine the policies and actions o f
nations do not respond to the objective facts of the situation, but to their image o f the
situation (Boulding 120). Presidents may judge events imperfectly or incorrectly or even
deceptively, but what they say is an effort to make sense out o f events and project courses
o f action (Wichelns 9). In other words, just like everyone else, presidents' past
experiences affect their perceptions so when the public listens to presidential crisis
communication, they are hearing about it from that individual's view of reality.
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The president's rhetoric establishes the urgency of a situation. Some scholars
argue that a crisis situation does not even exist as a crisis until leaders start talking about
it that way. Hart states that
even the most existential event, such as the bombing o f Pearl Harbor is
denied essential meaning in a president-dependent culture until the chief
executive delivers a speech about the event so as to make it meaningful
(Verbal Style 6).
Such a statement implies that any situation, regardless of how obviously serious and
threatening it may be, can be presented as a crisis or a less serious situation depending on
how the president wants the public to perceive it.5 Richard Cherwitz and Kenneth
Zagacki agree with Hart, saying events become crises not because o f unique sets of
situational exigencies, but by virtue of the discourse used to describe them (307). In
other words, the person describing the situation controls whether the language will create
a sense o f threat. Edelman concurs with this view, noting that usually a crisis is an
episode in a long sequence o f similar problems, and that a crisis is a creation o f the
language used to depict it (Constructing the Political Spectacle 31). Therefore, even
when people are aware of events leading up to a potential crisis, they do not classify it as
such until the president defines it as a crisis.
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In some cases, scholars argue that crisis rhetoric is used to actually manipulate
public perceptions of crisis situations. Jeffrey Tulis agrees that the public has trouble
identifying crisis situations. However, he blames this on a rhetorical presidency which
creates pseudo-crises (181). Tulis states that presidential speeches themselves have made
crisis rhetoric so routine that the public has lost the ability to distinguish between genuine
and spurious crises (179). In other words, because presidents use crisis rhetoric so often
when there is no real crisis, people can no longer identify the real thing.
Marilyn Young and Michael Launer strike some middle ground in this discussion,
concluding from their study of presidential rhetoric concerning the KAL 007 crisis, that
in a crisis atmosphere, the public relies on accumulated knowledge to
define the situation and determine appropriate action, which creates the
rhetorical situation in which the rhetor is expected to respond. Once the
rhetor does respond, the elements become interactive and the rhetor
informs and establishes the context in which the event will be evaluated
(288).
In other words, the public identifies an exigence that requires a response from the
president. However, they do not assign crisis level to the incident until the president
speaks, after which they place their previous knowledge into the context o f the situation
as established by the president.
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Presidents can use discourse to define reality, but they can also alter the
perception o f reality by what they do not say. When addressing the nation about crisis
situations, presidents can disclose whatever information they choose. They have the
power to present their most persuasive arguments, and they can omit potentially valuable
information such as facts about their previous failures in similar situations, or the views
of their critics, or details about alternative plans (Hart, Sound of Leadership 81). Clearly,
to include such information would not be in the best interests of speakers who are trying
to persuade the public to support their policies, but such omissions may limit public
understanding o f the reality of the situation.
Offering another example of how failure to speak alters reality, Farrell points out
that when the White House perceives that communication is out o f control and causing a
loss o f credibility for the president, as it did in the Three Mile Island incident, it can shut
down the information center. The Presidential Task Force that investigated the crisis
simply offered the conclusion that because the communication incompetence was so
widespread, any popular explanations being offered were not credible (Farrell 286-94).
By using the excuse that the information was inaccurate, they were able to shut off all
information and create a high level of public uncertainty. In this case, the White House
defined the crisis situation by providing no information and creating a very unstable
reality.
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Crisis rhetoric as persuasive strategy
Some research literature explores the persuasive characteristics o f presidential
crisis communication and how it is used to direct public thought and action. Bitzer
suggests that it is the very role o f crisis rhetoric to persuade the audience (5). Hart
remarks that "the most important decision a modem president makes is not that o f
deciding policy, but that o f articulating policy in ways that will make the Congress and
people want to adopt that policy" (Verbal Style 6). Although some might argue that this
is a rather extreme statement, implying that any presidential action will be acceptable to
the public if it is presented persuasively, most public speakers would agree that when
public support is required for success, even the most perfect plan o f action is doomed if it
is not presented effectively, and with the right presentation, even the sloppiest plan can be
made to appear brilliant.
Edelman suggests that in crisis situations presidents can persuade the public to
support White House policies by using rhetoric to focus attention where they want it.
Leaders are able to divert and orchestrate public concern because people who are fearful
respond with enthusiasm to those who offer clear definitions of enemies and
unambiguous promises o f solutions ( Edelman, Constructing Political Spectacle 59).
When people are faced with threats and uncertainty, they welcome the direction o f a
leader in control o f the situation.
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Hart provides additional insight into how public uncertainty can be a factor in the
power o f persuasive crisis rhetoric. In Verbal Stvle and the Presidency, he discusses how
presidents can manipulate the level of public anxiety through the use o f certain words.
For example, adding embellishment to stressful remarks heightens the gravity o f the
situation (Verbal Style 54), a formal speaking style emphasizes the symbolic role o f the
president as the nation's leader (53), and speeches exhibiting a high level o f certainty
result in higher public opinion polls following the speech (155). The public responds
positively to presidents who display high levels o f strong leadership and competency
characteristics.

Styles of crisis rhetoric
Another approach to studying crisis communication is to explore the various
rhetorical styles employed by presidents. The styles and strategies examined in current
crisis rhetoric literature fall into two general categories. One is the use o f myths and
metaphors to create enemy themes, and the other is crisis rhetoric based on personal and
social values.
Rhetorical strategies that create enemy themes

As was discussed previously, the

anxiety level o f the audience is considered a factor in using crisis rhetoric to persuade.
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Myths and metaphors can be used to create enemy themes as a rhetorical strategy for
presidents to employ to raise the public's anxiety level.
In Politics as Symbolic Action. Edelman offers an extensive discussion o f "enemy
themes" that evoke mass arousal and anxiety by describing the enemy as alien, a stranger
or even subhuman (115). Classic myths that revolve around hostile plotters and
benevolent leaders promote the belief that victory can be achieved over the enemy if the
group will work, sacrifice and obey its leaders (78). For people who are looking for
decisive leadership and clear solutions in a crisis situation, such myths identify an enemy
and a course o f action, which can be a welcome relief from the anxiety and uncertainty
about what action to take.
Presidents have used these types of enemy themes to describe the Communist
threat ever since Truman was president (Rasmussen 111). Communists have been
portrayed as people outside o f our society and therefore, strangers (Edelman, Politics as
Symbolic Action 115). However, enemy themes have not been limited to the Communist
threat. They have been used to describe Americans as well. Edelman discusses a speech
delivered by Richard Nixon in 1969 in South Dakota on law and order in which he
referred to dissenters and demonstrators as "those intoxicated with the romance o f violent
revolution" (Edelman, Politics 71). Clearly, although Nixon did not characterize the
protestors as aliens, he did place them outside the boundaries of acceptable society.
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Enemy theme discourse lends itself to rhetoric delivered to justify military
actions. Robert L. Ivie notes that rhetoric from the War of 1812 used images o f savage
enemies bent on rituals o f victimage (Metaphor o f Force in Prowar Discourse 240-253).
He explains that victimage rhetoric portrays images o f "evils forced upon a reluctant
nation by the aggressive acts o f an enemy" (Images o f Savagery 279). Ivie pursued the
study o f enemy themes as a rhetorical style used by American presidents in their
justification o f war. By analyzing the vocabulary of selected American presidents, he
was able to identify the metaphors they use that characterize victimage rhetoric
(Presidential Motives for War 337).
All o f these enemy themes contribute to public perceptions o f persecution and
conspiracy. Presidents use this strategy to provide a common enemy and the promise of
strong action to return the nation to stability.
Rhetorical strategy based on values

Another strategy for persuading the public to

support presidential decisions in crisis situations is to focus on the accepted social values
o f the society. Various scholars have identified and analyzed the use o f language that
promotes such values as patriotism, trust, democracy, freedom, and even religious values
in crisis rhetoric. For example, when Reagan discussed military power, it was in terms of
an essential instrument of national purpose (Goodnight 391). In other words, military
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action was necessary to preserve the nation's basic values such as freedom and
democracy.
Robert C. Rowland and Thea Rademacher call Reagan's use o f values a passive
style o f rhetorical crisis management. This style is employed by speakers who choose to
avoid taking firm positions on controversial subjects while expressing strong value
commitments to end the crises (Rowland and Rademacher 328). For example, during the
Superfund controversy Reagan spoke o f his personal commitment to the environment but
never answered the charges o f critics (Rowland and Rademacher 332).
In addition to avoiding controversial subjects by emphasizing social values,
Reagan focused on values in order to avoid providing detailed or technical information.
Janice Hocker Rushing notes that in his Star Wars addresses, Reagan avoided discussing
technical information. Instead, he chose to make social reasoning more powerful than
technical reasoning by telling his audience that they need not tax themselves to
understand the technical matters if they understand the greater purpose —preventing
nuclear obliteration (416). When the public seeks leadership during ambiguous or
complex situations, such as crises, this rhetorical strategy reduces the ambiguity by
eliminating the confusing information.
Previous to Reagan's presidency, Johnson used a similar values-based rhetorical
strategy to divert public attention from the immediate civil rights crisis by subordinating
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it to the need for regional and national unity and the desire for economic growth
(Zarefsky, Subordinating the Civil Rights Issue 117). Johnson chose to appeal to accepted
social values o f unity and national prosperity in order to focus public attention on the end,
not the means, of his political policies.
Edelman offers some discussion that seems related to the issues o f passive style
and the rhetorical use o f social values to control the focus o f public attention in a crisis
situation. In Political Language. Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail, he asserts
that crisis rhetoric typically rationalizes policies that are especially harmful to those who
are already disadvantaged. He suggests that a crisis hurts the poor more than those with
the resources to adapt and states that the government avoids rhetoric that calls attention to
unequal distribution o f goods and services. On the other hand, there is an increase in
rhetoric concerning threats that legitimize and expand authority. The former are
"problems" and the latter are "crises" (49). These statements not only relate to the
research on passive rhetoric as a strategy for diverting attention, but when presidents use
crisis rhetoric to define "problems" and "crises," they are using the discourse to define
reality.
Rowland and Rademacher refer to Reagan's passive rhetorical strategy as a
"rhetorical Teflon coating" (327), but that expression seems equally applicable to
Johnson's civil rights rhetoric and Edelman's statements about government's crisis
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rhetoric in general. In all cases, the rhetorical strategy allows the president to gloss over
the sticky issues such as controversy, demonstrations or complex technical information.
Rowland and Rademacher express concern that this style of crisis rhetoric "seriously
diminishes the capacity o f the public to make informed and rational decisions" (328).
However, Zarefsky argues that values-based discourse is the proper rhetorical
course, noting that "in a time of crisis, perhaps one of the president's chief duties is to
speak for the ordering of values to which he subscribes" (Civil Rights and Civil Conflict
65). Zarefsky goes on in his study of Johnson's civil rights rhetoric to suggest that an
individual president's personal values might very well direct the discourse for good
reason. His states that crisis events demand a quick response and presidents cannot
review systematically all possible response suggestions presented to them, so their
communication during a crisis is likely to reflect their intuitive value preferences (Civil
Rights and Civil Conflict 59). This view suggests that in crisis situations, presidents take
action based on instinct rather than studied deliberation with advisors.
Religious values have also been used to persuade the public during crisis
situations. G. Thomas Goodnight discusses how Ronald Reagan incorporated religious
values into his "Evil Empire" speech concerning potential nuclear crisis. Goodnight
suggests that using biblical quotations and speaking as a prophet demanding
righteousness, Reagan turned the nuclear arms debate into a spiritual conflict (400). This
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use of religious values in crisis rhetoric dates back to colonial times. It is based on the
jeremiad, a Puritan sermonic style in which listeners were made to feel they had brought
the evil upon themselves with their sins, but by following God's plan and working hard
together, they would be rewarded (Bormann 130, Hart, Modem Rhetorical 192). This
type o f speech creates a sense of fear and uncertainty that makes people receptive to
images o f enemies committing evil acts against the nation so that they respond to calls for
national unity. As Goodnight's study of Reagan's speech indicates, the jeremiad form of
rhetoric continues to be employed in modem times as a method to increase public anxiety
and persuade the audience that the only salvation is unified support o f the solutions
presented by their leader.6

Crisis rhetoric as a genre
Researchers who select the generic approach to study presidential crisis
communication search for common language patterns in the discourse. Karlyn Kohrs
Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson define genre as a classification based on the fusion
and interrelation o f elements in such a way that a unique kind o f rhetorical act is created
(25). They add that the rhetoric in a given genre will consist o f language forms that may
appear in isolation in other discourse, but within the genre, they appear together in a
certain combination every time (20). In other words, the images generated by the
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paragraphs, sentences and even individual words interact in unique, but consistently
identifiable patterns that provide clear indicators about the type o f situation that prompted
the discourse. There is some argument among scholars as to whether or not crisis rhetoric
is a genre.
One type o f crisis rhetoric discussed previously in this thesis, the jeremiad, is
identified by Hart as a genre (Modem Rhetorical 192). He defines a genre as a class of
messages, similar in structure and content, that create special expectations for the
listeners (183). This definition relates directly back to the scripts discussed in my
introduction to this thesis. Audiences have prescribed expectations of the form and
content o f presidential rhetoric based on contextual clues. For example, when the
television announcer interrupts a program for a special news bulletin, people anticipate
that some crisis will be the topic o f the message and that the message will be delivered
following the format of previously delivered crisis rhetoric. This societal understanding
o f the rules that dictate the traditional form and structure o f certain types o f messages is
the basis o f rhetorical genre.
Richard A. Cherwitz and Kenneth S. Zagacki support the theory that presidential
crisis communication during international crisis situations meets the criteria o f a genre,
explaining that "presidential messages contain discemable and recurring features that
shape public expectations regarding crisis management." They add that "these rhetorical
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patterns are so etched in public consciousness as to create immediate recognition when
present in presidential discourse" (308). Clearly, this description o f presidential crisis
communication includes recurring features that have similarities and familiar patterns that
create public expectations, thus meeting the criteria of a genre.
Cherwitz and Zagacki offer more detail about the generic characteristics o f crisis
rhetoric by identifying two subcategories: consummatory and justificatory.
Consummatory rhetoric is used when presidential discourse is the only official reply
made by the American government to a crisis situation. The speech is directed to a global
audience and seeks a global resolution. In such a speech, the president identifies who or
what is responsible for the emergency and outlines any economic or diplomatic actions
that the government may have taken (Cherwitz and Zagacki 308-316). It is discourse
used when no military action has been taken and the president is trying to solve the crisis
through economic or diplomatic means.
Justificatory rhetoric, on the other hand, is presidential discourse that announces
overt military retaliation taken by the U.S. government. The primary audiences are the
American public and the instigators o f the crisis (Cherwitz and Zagacki 308-316). In this
case, there is no hint o f compromise or debate. It is meant to be decisive and irrevocable.
Justificatory rhetoric was the focus o f research by Karen Rasmussen in which she
identified several characteristics and arguments o f justificatory rhetoric that strongly
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suggest it is a genre. She states that there are certain identifiable characteristics in a
perceived international crisis: 1) there is a demand for immediate action, 2) the crisis is
far removed from the people being asked to accept the justification, 3) the decision to
accept or reject the justification is based on little information, and 4) the themes of
justification are a variation on Truman's "The U.S. mission is to assume free world
leadership," which was based on America's chief enemy being Communism (111). In
other words, an international crisis will always require quick action and the public will
have little information on which to base its support of that action other than the traditional
anti-Communist, nuclear threat theme.
She goes on to identify the arguments that presidents use in justificatory rhetoric.
They are 1) U.S. action is necessary to further foreign policy goals, 2) the action meets
Communist duplicity and threats in a morally upright and strategically advantageous
manner, and 3) this action fares well when compared with enemy moves and other
alternatives (113). These arguments asking for public support are based on rhetorical
styles discussed previously, such as trust in the president as the legitimate and competent
leader o f the nation and on appeals to patriotic and social values.
Rasmussen concludes that justificatory rhetoric succeeds because 1) the speaker
transfers the action taken to widely accepted values of the audience, 2) U.S. citizens have
a predisposition toward action, 3) since the rhetoric is justificatory, the request is only for
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acceptance or rejection, not to take any responsibility, and 4) the crisis context does not
allow in-depth public exposure to information necessary for evaluating alternative
courses o f action (116). In other words, in light o f the public's propensity that something
be done, and the inherent nature o f crises which requires immediate decisions rather than
allowing time for discussion, a rhetorical appeal to American values is likely to gain
support for presidential policies in crisis situations. It appears that Rasmussen's clearly
defined outline o f justificatory rhetoric characteristics could be applied to any discourse
as a set o f structural and contextual similarities that create expectations among the
listeners, thus meeting the qualifications o f a genre.
Bonnie J. Dow looks at two other rhetorical strategies that bear some resemblance
to the consummatory and justificatory categories. They are epideictic and deliberative
rhetoric. Epideictic rhetoric is used to explain an issue in an effort to achieve communal
understanding. This is similar to the description of consummatory rhetoric. Deliberative
rhetoric, like justificatory rhetoric, is used to gain informal public and formal
Congressional approval for presidential action (297-303). Although Dow's categories
seem to parallel those o f Cherwitz and Rasmussen, she vehemently disagrees with any
scholarly attempt to define crisis rhetoric as a genre. She does not see enough similarities
in the speeches that have been studied, and she suggests that a definition o f crisis genre
would require an exhaustive study of all crisis rhetoric (307). Amos Kiewe agrees with
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Dow that not enough case studies exist to establish the existence o f a genre o f crisis
rhetoric (Kiewe xxin).
Taking the discussion a step further, Farrell argues that generic discourse is not
even possible in a crisis situation. In his study o f the rhetoric associated with the nuclear
power event at Three Mile Island in March o f 1979, Farrell found that traditional
communication patterns broke down in that crisis situation. He suggests that in a crisis,
the options o f discourse are almost never clear during the moments o f its unfolding. In
this instance, the highly technical nature o f the event made discourse even more difficult
as technicians, scientists and politicians all tried to use familiar language patterns to
present the problem to the public (272-274).
The result Farrell describes was ambiguous, perhaps even chaotic communication:
Rhetors search awkwardly for language capable o f defining, explaining
and assimilating urgent events. Audiences struggle to understand
information, set criteria for policy evaluation, and locate viable options for
action. The crisis does not so much 'invite' discourse as defy it (273).
In other words, in crisis situations, there can be no clear patterns or consistent
characteristics. In fact, Farrell suggests that in a crisis situation, it is nearly impossible to
communicate at all.
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Pratt suggests, however, that there may be a way to identify generic characteristics
o f crisis rhetoric. In his analysis o f speeches made by Eisenhower during the Suez crisis
in 1956, Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and Johnson during the G ulf o f
Tonkin crisis in 1964, Pratt concluded that the speaking characteristics o f the president
and the specific nature of the crisis combine to determine the type o f speech (202). He
seems to suggest that a crisis rhetoric genre can be defined by creating categories for
speaking styles and natures o f crises. Then researchers would use those categories to
identify similarities in discourse and generic characteristics. However, this method seems
much too broad and generalistic to meet the requirements for a rhetorical genre as defined
by Campbell and Jamieson.
Clearly, the issue o f whether crisis rhetoric qualifies as a genre is a topic o f
controversy among rhetorical scholars. The categories o f justificatory and consummatory
rhetoric seem to provide a basis in favor of the genre argument, but the unique nature o f
crisis situations forces consideration o f arguments that since each crisis is unique, the
rhetorical responses must be unique. In an article entitled "Eisenhower, Little Rock and
the Rhetoric of Crisis" published in The Modem Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric. Martin
J. Medhurst suggests that "...it seems highly unlikely that the rhetoric presidents use to
deal with crisis situations should be any more alike than the presidents themselves..."
(Medhurst 42).
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Summary
The literature concerning presidential crisis communication illustrates the variety
o f approaches available to researchers. Research discussed in this thesis fell into four
categories: rhetoric used to define reality in crisis situations, rhetoric used to persuade
audiences to accept chosen courses o f action, various rhetorical styles used by presidents
and a generic approach to crisis rhetoric. While each method o f analysis produces a
valuable perspective o f the discourse, it also raises questions that invite other types of
analysis. For example, a study o f crisis rhetoric as persuasion can lead to a discussion of
how the rhetor can use it to define reality. A study of the generic form o f the jeremiad is
directly related to the rhetorical use of myths and metaphors. It is because o f this overlap
and interaction o f strategies that presidential crisis communication lends itself to the
methodology o f rhetorical criticism.
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CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGY

Rhetorical criticism
Rhetorical criticism is the investigation and evaluation o f rhetorical acts and
artifacts. Hart says it is the business of identifying the complications o f rhetoric and
explaining them in a comprehensive and efficient manner (Modem Rhetorical Criticism
32). It is a way of exploring the interaction of communication symbols and the situations
in which they exist.
Rhetorical criticism involves the study o f all aspects o f communication situations.
Both the text and the context must be considered (Hart, Modem Rhetorical 60). A
message is not created in a vacuum. Critics must understand the psychological,
sociological and historical context of the message by examining the discourse for clues —
Hart calls them "genetic markers" (58) —that add meaning to the reasons why speakers
say what they say, where, when and to whom. When both the text and the context of
presidential crisis rhetoric is studied, it leads communication researchers to a more
comprehensive understanding o f crisis communication.
Foss suggests that there are two reasons to engage in rhetorical criticism. One is
to understand particular symbols and how they operate (5). Presidential crisis
communication lends itself to this purpose for rhetorical criticism. Many variables
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interact in a piece o f crisis rhetoric, and rhetorical criticism allows for the examination of
all those variables and their relationships to each other. For example, the impact of the
speaker-audience relationship is evident when presidents whose elections were supported
by labor speak at union conventions. Because of that relationship the presidents'
messages are likely to be well-received. The relationship between the topic and the
speaker's personal background may also affect the message if, for example, the speaker is
a president who never served in the military and the topic is an international crisis that
requires military action.
In additional to examining the relationships between speakers, audiences and
topics, rhetorical criticism examines the specific language of the text to discover images
and language patterns that might dominate a message or be common to every message.
This study o f the words and relationships o f discourse is the process and the purpose of
rhetorical criticism.
The second purpose o f rhetorical criticism is to contribute to rhetorical theory
(Foss 6). Critics may study rhetorical acts and artifacts in order to lend support to
existing theories or they may break new ground in the field, discovering new principles o f
effective rhetoric. For example, when political discourse began to be widely televised in
the 1960's, it changed the emphasis in political speechmaking from memorable discourse
to memorable sound bytes.8 Rhetorical criticism o f events like the Nixon - Kennedy

34
debates provided new information for rhetorical theory so that political leaders could
adapt their speaking style to the new age o f electronic media. The contributions of
rhetorical criticism to theoretical perspectives are extremely valuable as speakers strive to
become more effective communicators.

Rhetorical criticism methods
There are a number o f methods for doing rhetorical criticism, all o f them
qualitative.9 Rhetorical criticism is not built around statistical data, but rather, it is
discursive, offering arguments about the rhetorical acts or artifacts being studied, and
presenting descriptive information to support those arguments.
Speeches are the primary source of information about what rhetors perceive and
about how they try to shape the perceptions of their audience. The critic does not study
speeches only to learn the speaker's positions on issues. O f essential interest to the
rhetorical critic is the way in which the speaker attempts to make issues salient and ideas
persuasive (Wichelns 9). The goal o f effective rhetoric is to persuade the audience to
support the views of the speaker in both thought and action.
The rhetorical critic asks three general research questions:
"What is the relationship between the rhetorical artifact and its context?"
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"How does the message construct a particular reality for the audience and
the rhetor?"
"What does the rhetorical artifact suggest about the rhetor?" (Foss xi)
In this thesis, I go beyond these general questions through a series o f more
specific questions, based on Hart’s model of the rhetorical situation, to closely examine
presidential crisis communication.

The rhetorical situation
The methodology for this thesis is based on Hart's rhetorical situation model
which provides a framework for developing the critical probes necessary to study both
the text and the context o f discourse (Modem Rhetorical 71).
There are six elements in Hart's model: speaker, setting, audience, topic,
persuasive field and medium. All o f these elements are constrained by rhetorical
conventions and are contained within the cultural boundary. (See Appendix A.)
The element of SPEAKER addresses the "who" factor —whether presidents
speak to the public directly or have surrogates speak for them. Issues to consider are
what experiences might be in the president's background that could influence the
rhetorical strategy, and how the symbols of the presidency establish legitimacy and
competency.
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SETTIN G involves timing and location. In a crisis situation, the president might
speak directly to the public concerning a late breaking news incident, but in fact, that
rarely occurs. Most often, the presidents address issues some time after the public has
learned o f them through other spokespersons who may or may not represent the president.
So the question arises as to how much time people have had to filter information about
the news event before they hear from the president, and whether that time lag has any
influence on how the public reacts to the president's position. Timing may also be a factor
if the statement is being made early in the president's term of office or nearing election
time.
The location at which the president delivers his message can also be a factor that
influences public perception o f the message. Was the speech delivered from the Oval
Office, a strong symbol o f the presidency, or from a fishing boat? Was the speech part o f
a news conference scheduled to address a specific topic or at a scheduled appearance
where the president is a guest speaker?
A study o f the element of AUDIENCE may include research into public opinion
polls prior to and following presidential statements in order to determine whether the
public was predisposed to accept or reject the statement. Was the statement delivered to a
generally hostile or friendly audience? How much information would the audience be
likely to have had prior to the president's statement?
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T O PIC goes beyond the facts o f the news story. Issues to consider are whether
the topic has been in the news previously, how complex it is and whether it is
controversial.
The PERSUASIVE FIELD consists o f all those other messages impinging upon
an audience in a given speech situation. It may include rumors, related news stories and
statements made in the past on this topic by anyone, including the president.
The element of M EDIUM concerns the channels through which the president
delivers the message -- print, broadcast, and in person.
All o f these elements are filtered through R H ETO RICA L CONVENTIONS
which address the rules that have been established in the past concerning talk about this
topic, and the result is the MESSAGE.
All of these elements of the rhetorical situation occur within a CULTURAL
BOUNDARY that encompasses all the values, attitudes and beliefs o f the national
culture. Hart notes that rhetoric is rooted in the age of its creation (Modem Rhetorical
10). Any analysis o f crisis rhetoric must include acknowledgement o f the influence that
culture has on audience perceptions and reactions. In addition, rhetoric loses its relevancy
when it is examined outside the culture which gave rise to it.
These rhetorical situation elements interact, sometimes in very complex ways,
within any piece o f presidential discourse. As the research progresses, there is overlap in
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the data collected, which is natural since the elements themselves interact in order to
create the discourse being studied. Through the use o f critical probes which operate as a
road map, specific presidential crisis rhetoric can be explored and symbol interaction
within these six elements can be discovered.

Proposed study
Research o f any kind, by its very nature, offers many possibilities for exploration,
and no matter which paths scholars may follow, they are inevitably faced with a
multitude of choices as to which direction to follow next. Rhetorical criticism is no
different. In fact, if anything, rhetorical criticism seems to have infinite possibilities and
every question leads to dozens more. Therefore, perhaps the most difficult task o f a piece
o f rhetorical criticism is to define its limits.
A critical study of presidential crisis communication presents a challenge in
establishing limits. It not only raises questions about the president's actual speech during
crisis situations, but also questions o f agenda setting by the media, public opinion
patterns, and the cultural climate at the time of the speech. It raises issues o f character
and the relationship o f the president's language to his espoused personal values or
background. It points out the fluctuations in public perception when similar words
spoken by two different presidents elicit totally different public reactions.
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Each o f these questions could stand alone as a critical study, but any research into
one will inevitably lead to the others, and more. Therefore, it is necessary to define the
focus for this thesis and save the other questions for future research. As I discussed in the
introduction to this thesis, the crisis rhetoric of any president would be valuable to study.
However, this thesis focuses on the crisis rhetoric of George Bush during his term in
office from 1988 through 1992.
Narrowing the focus of study to one president, George Bush, still left a multitude
of examples of crisis rhetoric available for study. During his four years as president there
were many incidents that he spoke about, so before Bush's crisis rhetoric could be
studied, crisis situations to which he might have responded had to be identified and
selected for study.
Not every event that Bush spoke about was a crisis, so one way to sift through the
pool o f potential pieces o f discourse for study was to define what types of crisis situations
would be included. Based on a synthesis o f the various definitions o f "crisis" presented
previously (see page 11), a "crisis" for purposes of this study was defined as a time
specific situation that creates a sense of uncertainty and is potentially threatening to
national security. In addition, it must be a situation that can be acted upon by the
president and it must be a situation that has the attention of the American public. This
definition precludes ongoing situations such as a recession which cannot be isolated to a
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particular time period in Bush's presidency. It also eliminates natural disasters, the course
o f which cannot be altered by actions from the White House.
During George Bush's presidency, there were a number o f situations that created a
sense o f uncertainty and potential threat to the nation's security. In each case the course
o f action in response to the situation could have been, or was, affected by White House
action. These situations include the Persian Gulf War, the Panama Invasion, the Rodney
King verdict, the taking of American hostages in several Arab countries, the Waco, Texas
incident, the opening of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, Supreme Court
decisions on abortion and on flag burning, the downing o f an Iranian passenger plane by a
U.S. Navy ship, tourist murders in Florida, civil wars in Bosnia, Somalia and Liberia, the
Oliver North trial, nuclear arms reduction agreements, Washington Mayor Marion
Barry's drug trial, Columbian drug wars, racial violence in New York City and in
Virginia Beach, the Savings and Loan scandal, the stock market crash and the lifting of
the trade embargo on South Africa (Times Mirror 43-50).
This list o f situations was quickly narrowed by adding the criterion o f public
attention. Based on the Times Mirror Database of Public Attendance to Major News
Stories.10 more than fifty percent o f the American public followed four o f these major
news stories very closely. Two of the stories were international situations that involved
the U.S. military and two dealt with domestic crisis situations.
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The two international crises involved the deployment o f U.S. armed forces to
Panama and to the Persian Gulf.11 The invasion o f Panama occurred on December 29,
1989. The Persian Gulf War was a crisis that extended over several months, but the
moment at which the crisis was at its peak was on August 8, 1990, when Iraq invaded
Kuwait and U.S. forces were deployed to Saudi Arabia.
The two domestic crises involved issues o f civil unrest. The Los Angeles riots
following the Rodney King verdict began on April 29,1992. The Supreme Court decision
on flag burning, which was handed down on June 21, 1989, had the potential to trigger
civil unrest.
These four situations meet the criteria established by the definition o f a crisis for
the purpose o f this thesis. In addition, inclusion o f two domestic crises serves the
purpose o f going beyond previous studies of crisis rhetoric which focused on
international crises. As a result, these four events provide opportunities to examine
similarities in crisis rhetoric as well as differences between international and domestic
crisis communication.
In this thesis, I explore both the text and the context o f George Bush's discourse
concerning the selected crisis situations in order to gain a better understanding o f his
responses to those events. Additionally, I present information to investigate the argument
as to whether crisis rhetoric is a genre.
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The rhetoric examined for this thesis was limited to oral presidential discourse
concerning these four crisis situations that was printed in the Public Papers o f the
Presidents during the time period from two weeks prior to two weeks following the date
on which the incident occurred. The printed text o f all communication during those fourweek periods was coded to establish a data base o f specifics about the discourse. Coding
categories were based on Hart's coding procedures used in Sound o f Leadership (217220 ).
For each crisis situation, I recorded the following information (See Table XVI):
1.

Total number o f communications from the White House during the fourweek period surrounding the situation.

2.

How many o f those mentioned the situation.

3.

How many o f those mentioning the event were delivered verbally by the
president rather than by White House spokespersons..

For each presidential speech, I recorded the following information (See Tables XVIIXX):
1.

Date o f remarks

2.

Time o f day

3.

Location
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4.

Main topic of the speech 12

5.

Audience type: national, press or special interest

In addition to the recorded data concerning the president's remarks, I analyzed the
discourse using the following critical probes based on Hart's Modem Rhetorical Criticism
and the generic research o f Cherwitz and Zagacki and Rasmussen:
1.

Did the rhetoric reflect an awareness by the speaker o f the audience
attitude (Hart 76)?

2.

Was there a consistent structure to the message (Hart 168)?

3.

Did the discourse have consummatory or justificatory characteristics
(Cherwitz and Zagacki 316)?

4.

Did the speaker use enemy themes in the discourse? (Rasmussen 155)?

The recorded data and analysis through critical probes provides information about
the text o f the crisis rhetoric, but to fully understand the discourse, the research must
include information about the persuasive field -- the issues surrounding the crisis that are
being discussed by the general public. In order to establish an understanding o f the
persuasive field surrounding the crisis situations selected for this thesis, I examined the
media coverage and the public opinion polls during the four weeks surrounding each
crisis event.
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Information on media coverage was obtained by examining the 32 issues o f Time
and Newsweek magazines that were published during the two weeks before each crisis
event and the two weeks following the event. These two major national newsweeklies
were selected because o f their national influence. According to Michael Baruch
Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, they are the only print publications that approximate
television news' connection to the American public (62). They have a combined
circulation o f more than seven million copies weekly and are read by a segment o f the
American population that is identified as well-off and well-educated (Grossman and
Kumar 62).
From those magazines, I recorded the following information:
1.

What were the cover stories?

2.

Did the cover stories relate to the crisis situation?

3.

Were there any other stories related to the crisis situation?

I used The Gallup Poll Monthly to track public opinion polls during the four-week
time periods surrounding the crisis events plus the month immediately prior to and
immediately following each crisis event. From those polls, I recorded the following
information:
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1.

What questions related to the crisis situation did the pollsters ask the
public?

2.

What was the public response to those questions related to the crisis
situation?

3.

What was the presidential performance rating during that time period?

All of the data collected was analyzed to provide the most comprehensive
examination o f the George Bush's presidential crisis rhetoric that is possible within the
limits of this thesis. The critical process I have chosen to use meets the criteria discussed
previously for doing rhetorical criticism (see page 30). It provides information about how
the elements of communication operate and interact in order to promote more effective
communication. It adds to the body o f rhetorical theory by contributing data on crisis
rhetoric as a genre. As this study of George Bush's domestic and international crisis
communication unfolds, it also expands the current research on the differences and
similarities of international and domestic crisis rhetoric.
To begin the analysis of George Bush's crisis rhetoric, a background o f the issues
surrounding the crises studied is necessary. Such background information is what makes
up the persuasive field for each crisis situation and thus identifies the topics o f discussion,
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public opinions and general attitudes that may have constrained Bush's rhetoric as he
dealt with these crises.

Persuasive Field
The persuasive field is one of the elements of Hart's Rhetorical Situation Model
(see appendix A). It is any discussion — by the media, by government officials, even by
one^s neighborhood association that might constrain the discourse on a particular topic
and that might affect how audiences perceive the speakers' remarks.
Before moving to specific analysis of Bush's crisis communication, we need to
understand the persuasive field and how it relates to the research for this thesis. It is very
tempting to relate the persuasive field to the president's discourse and draw conclusions.
For example, analysis o f the persuasive field during the Flag Desecration crisis revealed a
Gallup Poll report stating that 61 percent of the public had a favorable opinion o f the
Supreme Court (Gallup, May 1989, 9). With a generally favorable public view o f the
Supreme Court, Bush would have to choose his words carefully in announcing his
support o f a Constitutional amendment that contradicted their recent decision on flag
desecration. O f course, before analyzing Bush's remarks to see how he walked this
rhetorical fine line, we would have to do more research into the persuasive field,
including studying the trend o f public opinion concerning the Supreme Court over several
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months. However, such analysis would take the researcher into areas o f agenda setting
and speculation about what was on Bush's mind as he prepared each speech. As I
explained in Chapter 1, for this thesis I have chosen not to be drawn into those areas. My
purpose in examining the persuasive field is to acknowledge it as part o f Hart's Rhetorical
Situation Model and to provide a background for discussion o f Bush's crisis rhetoric. In
Chapter 3, which is a discussion of Bush's style and strategy, and in Chapter 4 which is a
discussion o f crisis rhetoric as a genre, I illustrate, through specific examples, some
patterns and some inconsistencies in Bush's rhetoric. Where appropriate, I have provided
support for my analysis from the information I collected on the persuasive field.
To ascertain the persuasive field for this study, data was gathered from news
magazines and public opinion polls for the weeks surrounding the crisis events studied.
Each issue of Time and Newsweek magazine during the four-week window surrounding
each crisis was examined for articles that related in any way to the crisis. Also, issues of
13

The Gallup Report Monthly were examined for information about public opinion during
the month in which each crisis occurred as well as during the month prior to and
following each crisis event. The following discussion provides a brief background of
each crisis situation and a review o f the relevant media material which contributed to the
persuasive field at the time of the crisis.
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Flag Desecration
In 1984, Gregory I. Johnson was found guilty in Dallas, Texas under a law against
defiling the flag for burning the American flag in a demonstration o f protest outside the
Republican National Convention. On June 21,1989, the United States Supreme Court
overturned that decision, stating that to prohibit flag burning violated one's Constitutional
right, under the first amendment, to freedom o f speech. Following the Supreme Court
decision, on June 30, 1989, President Bush and members o f Congress called for a
constitutional amendment making desecration of the flag illegal (Newsweek, July 3,
1989, 18-20). Fortunately, this situation did not develop into a crisis that threatened lives
or property, but at the time o f Bush's announcement, it certainly had the potential to
develop into something very serious. The symbolic nature o f the American flag stirred
emotional responses among American citizens on both sides of the desecration issue —
those who saw the flag as a symbol o f patriotism and those who saw it as a symbol o f
freedom.
Newsweek and Time magazines only had three articles concerning the Flag
Desecration crisis during the time period examined for this thesis. 14 Newsweek!s only
story about flag desecration appeared in the July 3 issue, four days after Bush's
announcement calling for a constitutional amendment. The story in the July 3 issue was
not the cover story, but it was a three-page story called "A Fight for Old Glory" which
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reported on the Supreme Court decision and included photographs o f protesters (18-20).
That same week, Time had two articles about the flag. They also were not cover stories.
One was a two-page story about the Supreme Court decision with a photograph o f a flagbumer being arrested. The other was a one-page story under the category o f "The
Presidency" called "Giving Honor to Old Glory." This article included a small
photograph o f Bush pledging allegiance to the flag (14-16). It is worth noting that neither
magazine chose to run any stories on the Flag Desecration crisis in the two issues
immediately following Bush's announcement.

Table I: Newsmagazine coverage of Flag Desecration crisis
June 12 to July 3,1989
Cover stories about crisis

Other crisis stories

Newsweek

0

1

Time

0

2

While these were the only stories specifically concerning the Flag Desecration
crisis, there were other articles that the public may have related to the flag-burning issue.
For example, in the June 12 issue of Time there was an article about the rise in violent
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crime by young Americans (52-58), and one in the June 26 issue o f Time about recent
Supreme Court decisions and how the court is becoming more conservative (16-18).
Since the Flag Desecration crisis involved flag burning -- a violent act, arid a Supreme
Court decision, these articles were part o f the persuasive field, part o f the "talk" about the
issue.
In The Gallup Report Monthly for May, June and July o f 1989, there were no
polls taken specifically concerning burning the flag, the Supreme Court decision, or the
proposed constitutional amendment. However, there was some information that suggests
constraints on Bush's discourse. In the May, 1989 issue, Gallup reported a slight drop,
from 58 percent to 56 percent, in Bush's approval rating between April and May. (8,10).
In addition Gallup reported that 61 percent o f the public had a favorable opinion o f the
Supreme Court and 21 percent had an unfavorable opinion (9). However, in the June,
1989 issue there was a report on public opinion concerning crime and the judicial system
which stated that 73 percent of the public have "little or no confidence in the courts'
ability to convict and properly sentence criminals" (23).
Examination o f the persuasive field during the time period surrounding the Flag
Desecration crisis revealed very little direct coverage of the issue by Time, Newsweek or
The Gallup Poll Monthly. This seems surprising since the topic was hotly debated in
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Congress. However, these media sources did include discussions o f related issues
including crime, violence, the Supreme Court and Bush's approval rating.

Panama Invasion
When George Bush became President, he declared the war on drugs to be a
priority and in particular, he targeted General Manuel Noriega, dictator o f Panama and an
illegal drug trafficker. On December 20, 1989, Bush announced a U.S. military invasion
o f Panama. Guillermo Endara, who had won election as Panama's leader in May o f 1989
and then was driven out by Noriega's forces, took control o f the government on
December 21 while Noriega sought refuge in the Papal Nuncio (Newsweek, January 1,
1990, 14-22). Throughout the crisis, there was on-going military action as well as
diplomatic and economic action taken by the U.S. government. On January 3, 1990,
Noriega turned himself in to U.S. authorities in Panama.
The Panama Invasion was a secret military action ordered by Bush within his
powers as President. Prior to the invasion, there was no official Congressional debate and
little public discussion on such military action. Media coverage o f the invasion began
with the January 1, 1990 news magazine issues.15 The Panama invasion was the cover
story in the January 1 issue of Newsweek (12-22). Related stories in that issue were about
Bush's presidency and the difficulties that may develop in Panama following the invasion
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(23-29). Time did not use the invasion for its cover story on January 1, but there were
some related articles in that issue concerning how the invasion illustrated Bush's
increasing "boldness in foreign affairs" (20-3), and a perspective on the political
leadership situation in Panama (24-31).

Table II: Newsmagazine coverage of Panama Invasion crisis
December 11,1989 to January 1,1990
Cover stories about crisis

Other crisis stories

Newsweek

1

4

Time

0

6

In addition to newsmagazine stories concerning the specific crisis being studied,
we must also take note o f other stories during the time period studied that were also part
o f the persuasive field for that crisis. On December 11, Newsweek carried a brief article
about how U.S. military intervention saved Aquino's presidency from an attempted coup
in the Philippines. Although a military action in the Philippines might seem to have little
relationship to the Panama situation, the title o f the article suggested otherwise:
"Washington Fights the Noriega Factor," a reference to a coup attempt against Noriega in
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Panama the previous October which did not receive strong White House support, and
according to the Newsweek authors, created the image of indecisiveness in the White
House concerning military intervention (58). The December 18 issue o f Newsweek elso
included a story about the coup attempt in the Philippines (38-39). The December 25
issue o f Newsweek included an article about an American church worker who was home
for the holidays from El Salvador and had reported on the rebel violence there (52), and
the December 25 issue of Time included a two-page full photo spread showing violence
in Panama City as part o f its section on photos from the past year (50-51). These two
articles, part o f the persuasive field, supported the views of those concerned about a
general sense of political instability in Central America.
The November and December, 1989 and January, 1990 issues o f The Gallup
Report were examined for polls and articles related to the Panama Invasion. In the
November, 1989 issue, polls revealed that Central America was Bush's weak point in
terms o f public opinion of his job performance. The report stated that 70 percent o f the
population approved o f Bush's performance, higher than any president in his first term in
office since John Kennedy. In that report, Bush received 81 percent approval for his
handling o f U.S.-Soviet relations and 65 percent for his handling of foreign policy in
general (4). However, the article noted that "Central America remains one area o f foreign
policy that is not a clear positive for Bush...40 percent approve; 39 percent disapprove"
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(5). In the December, 1989 issue, Bush received a 71 percent approval rating for his
performance (6). Those polls were taken prior to the invasion and there were no
mentions o f Panama or Central America in that issue. In the January, 1990 issue, Bush's
job approval rating was 80 percent, "his all-time high and the second highest approval
rating ever recorded in The Gallup Poll Monthly" (16)16 However, the most interesting
result reported in that issue was an increase in Bush's approval rating for his handling of
the Central America situation, an increase to 66 percent (16).
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*

Based on these polls, it

would seem that the public approved of Bush's Panama Invasion action, and in terms of
public support in general, Bush had few constraints on his discourse.

The Persian G ulf Crisis
For months prior to the deployment of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf, Iraq's
dictator, Saddam Hussein had been threatening military action against the nation of
Kuwait. There was a great deal of global diplomatic activity that took place during those
months and Bush spoke often on the topic. On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and
Bush began to seek support from other countries for United Nations economic sanctions
against Iraq. Those sanctions were passed by the U.N. Security Council on August 6.
During this time, Bush also held discussions with NATO countries concerning
participation in military action against Iraq if necessary. On August 8, Bush deployed
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U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf to enforce the U.N. sanctions and to defend Kuwait and
other Middle East countries threatened by Iraq. Many other nations also sent troops
(Newsweek, August 13, 1990, 18-21).
A unique aspect of this military action was the television coverage o f the war as it
was happening. For the first time in history, the American public sat in front of their
televisions and watched live coverage o f missiles being fired, saw tanks and troops under
attack and heard, unedited, the emotion in the voices o f soldiers and reporters in battle
zones. The Pentagon did censor some o f the media satellite transmissions, but there was
more than enough television time to give the public a front-row seat, first-hand view of
the effects of Bush's chosen action. This gave Bush many opportunities to reach the
public and build support, but it also put his decisions under a powerful magnifying glass - it would be difficult to downplay any unsuccessful actions.
During the time period studied for this thesis, Time and Newsweek were again
analyzed for news magazine coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis
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. In their August 6

issue, Newsweek carried a brief story in the Business Section suggesting that Hussein's
sending troops to the Kuwait border was a move to control OPEC's oil production and
prices 19. The article referred to Hussein as "...the key OPEC player o f the '90's" (50).
The article also mentioned that Congress had imposed additional sanctions against Iraq.
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Table III: Newsmagazine coverage of the Persian G ulf crisis
July 30,1990 to August 20* 1990
Cover stories about crisis

Other crisis stories

Newsweek

2

15

Time

2

10

In the August 13 issues, the Persian Gulf crisis was the cover story for both Time
and Newsweek. The lead article in Newsweek was about Hussein as an aggressor (1620). Related articles were about Hussein as leader of the Arab world, Kuwait as an oil
kingdom, U.S. military readiness and oil prices (23-30). In their August 13 issue, Time
lead with a story called "Iraq’s Power Grab" (16-20). Related articles were about the
issues o f oil and Hussein's power in the Middle East (21-24). All o f these stories focused
on Hussein as the enemy, unleashing vast amounts o f information justifying action
against him. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, Bush constantly made use o f this enemy
theme in his speeches during the Persian Gulf crisis.
The August 20 issue o f Newsweek also led with the Gulf War. Articles focused
on U.S. military readiness, hostages in Tehran, a history o f how Hussein came to power,
how Bush's early education may have contributed to his decision making processes in this
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crisis, the impact of the Gulf crisis on oil prices and the economy, and an editorial piece
on the role o f the U.S. in the Gulf (18-41). The cover story for the August 20 issue o f
Time was about the power struggle between Bush and Hussein (18-22). Related articles
were about global efforts to stop Hussein, the issue o f Arab leaders on opposite sides of
the conflict, Israel's position in the conflict, and oil issues (26-43). In this August 20
group o f articles, there were two of particular interest because they related to Bush's use
o f values in his crisis rhetoric, a key to Bush's rhetorical style and strategy that will be
discussed in Chapter 3. The article in Newsweek on his prep school education provided
insight into the formation o f his moral and ethical values, which were the foundation o f
Bush's crisis rhetoric. The cover story in Time about the power struggle between Bush
and Hussein created a powerful backdrop for Bush's enemy theme discourse.
With all o f the above articles concerning the specific crisis being studied, it is
still important to examine any other articles that addressed related issues in the persuasive
field during that time period. For example, a story in the science section o f the August 13
issue o f Newsweek was about recent studies o f children bom to survivors o f the atomic
bombs dropped on Japan in World War II (65-66). This article was significant because
Hussein was threatening to use missiles with biological warheads and there was a great
deal o f fear and speculation about the effects o f such weapons. Another Newsweek
article, which appeared in the August 20 issue, was a historical piece on the Battle of
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Britain, triggering memories o f the cooperative efforts o f Allied forces in World War II,
similar to the present cooperative military efforts o f NATO members in the Persian Gulf
(50). Finally, in the August 13 issue o f Time there was a story about Muslim nationalists
in Trinidad and the issue o f worldwide terrorism (26). Since Hussein was being
portrayed as a Muslim terrorist, this story was simply adding support to that enemy
theme.
Unlike the Panama Invasion, the Persian Gulf crisis was covered in The Gallup
Poll Monthly

20

. In July, there was no mention o f the Persian G ulf situation specifically,

but in the area o f foreign policy, Bush's approval rating was 62 percent (3). His overall
approval rating was 63 percent (2). In that issue, a report on a survey o f Bush's personal
characteristics indicated that 75 percent of the population found him to be sincere, 72
percent found him reliable, 66 percent found him intelligent, 76 percent found him
confident, 84 percent found him friendly, 63 percent found him weak, 67 percent saw him
as a leader and 70 percent saw him as an active president (5). These views o f George
Bush's personal and professional characteristics may have impinged on the persuasive
field as he delivered his remarks during the Persian Gulf crisis.
The August 1990 issue of The Gallup Poll Monthly featured the Gulf Crisis as its
cover story. Reports o f weekly public opinion polls on the Persian Gulf Crisis for the
entire month o f August were published. Information from surveys conducted August 3
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and 4 revealed that a majority of Americans supported direct U.S. military intervention if
Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, or if Americans were taken prisoner, and that Americans
strongly favored economic sanctions against Iraq. During this time period, 52 percent
approved Bush's handling of the crisis, 16 percent disapproved and 32 percent were not
sure (3). However, public support for Bush increased quickly once he announced U.S.
military action in the Persian Gulf.
Results o f surveys on the crisis taken August 9-12 immediately following Bush's
announcement o f the deployment of U.S. troops, showed that 78 percent of the
population approved o f sending U.S. troops to defend Saudi Arabia (7). In addition,
Bush's overall approval rating improved to 74 percent and his approval rating for
handling the Gulf Crisis was 80 percent (7).
In surveys taken August 16-19 Bush's support remained steady. Seventy-six
percent o f the population approved of Bush's decision to send troops to the Persian Gulf
and his overall approval rating was at 75 percent (14). Public attention to the crisis had
also increased. Seventy-four percent of Americans said they had a clear idea o f why the
U.S. was involved in the Gulf War (14,17). When asked for those reasons, 49 percent
said to defend oil interests, 17 percent said to defend other countries, 11 percent said to
stop Iraqi aggression, 6 percent said to defend Saudi Arabia, 4 percent said to protect U.S.
citizens, 1 percent said to get Iraq out o f Kuwait, and the other 12 percent had other
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answers or no opinion (16). These responses are interesting in light o f Bush's stated goals
for the military operation and will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
The Persian Gulf crisis continued to be covered in the September issue o f The
Gallup Poll Monthly. There were two reports directly related to the Persian Gulf. In view
o f the intense media coverage o f the crisis, a survey concerning media treatment o f Bush
during the Gulf crisis was o f particular interest. In that survey, 71 percent o f the
population felt that the media was "about right." Thirteen percent felt the media was too
critical and 10 percent felt they were not critical enough (22). Also reported in the
September issue, 65 percent of Americans thought that there was a better chance for
peace in the Middle East because o f U.S.-Soviet cooperation (27).
In addition to Gallup polls concerning the Persian Gulf crisis and Bush's
performance, the August issue provided a report on a survey that tracked public
confidence in ten major institutions. The results were that the military ranked highest, a
valuable indicator for Bush as he committed troops to a major international military
action (30-31).

Los Angeles Riots
Like the Persian Gulf crisis, the Los Angeles situation was preceded by extensive
media coverage o f the events leading up to the crisis point identified for this thesis —the
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Los Angeles Riots on April 29, 1992. The racial tension that gave rise to the rioting was
triggered by the police beating o f Rodney King, an African-American man, which was
captured on videotape. The police were charged with using excessive force and, after a
change o f venue to Simi Valley, a predominantly white, middle-class community, a trial
was held before a jury, made up o f ten Caucasians, one Hispanic and one Filipino. They
found the policemen not guilty, a verdict that ignited rioting in African-American and
nearby Korean-American neighborhoods in Los Angeles. Bush, who was at that time
campaigning for the 1992 Presidential election, sent in military troops to help restore
order and ordered an investigation into a federal prosecution o f the policemen (Time,
May 11, 1992, 20-25). After calm was restored, Bush went to Los Angeles to meet with
victims o f the riots and with city officials.
The Los Angeles riots took place in the midst of the 1992 Presidential campaign
so Bush's actions were under more than the usual amount of media scrutiny. This fact
was a key constraint on Bush's rhetoric concerning this crisis. For example, the May 11,
1992 issue of Time gave a running, and critical, commentary o f Bush's initial actions
concerning the crisis. Suggesting that Bush missed an opportunity to gamer support from
people on both sides o f the issue, the author stated, "Bush is also often a half-beat behind
the mood of the moment, and so he was this time" (25). The author o f the article
continued to chronicle Bush's missteps noting that on Wednesday evening "he gave

62
reporters an utterly inadequate statement," and Thursday's remarks were "stem in
condemning the rioting but confusing about what, if anything, he intended to do about the
verdict" (25). On Friday, "he [Bush) at last got the message about right" (25). This type
o f reporting is a good example of the constraints present in the persuasive field which
added to the rhetorical pressure that Bush was under as President and as a presidentialcandidate during the Los Angeles Riots crisis.
The Los Angeles Riots crisis was the cover story o f the May 11 issue for both
Time and Newsweek (Time, 18-25; Newsweek 26)
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. Related articles in Time were about

racial tension in Los Angeles, an analysis o f the trial that acquitted King's attackers, an
interview with Los Angeles Chief o f Police Willie Williams, the role o f black politicians
in Los Angeles and an editorial piece on what action Bush should take (26-41). Related
articles in Newsweek that week were about the violence and destruction o f the riots, crime
as a political issue, and how racism and poverty contributed to the Los Angeles crisis (3054). Crime and violence, which were domestic issues in the Presidential campaign, were
clearly part o f the persuasive field during this crisis.
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Table IV: Newsmagazine coverage of the Los Angeles Riots crisis
April 20,1992 to May 11,1992
Cover stories about crisis

Other crisis stories

Newsweek

1

11

Time

1

6

Other campaign related articles that were an important part o f the persuasive field
appeared in the April 27 and May 4 issues of Time and the April 27 issue o f Newsweek.
These articles included candidates' responses to questions about how they would handle
the crisis so Bush not only had to consider the "talk" in the persuasive field from the
media and the general public, but also from his rival candidates whose responses could
seriously constrain his rhetorical options.
The March 1992 issue o f The Gallup Poll Monthly did not contain anything
•

•

•

directly related to the situation in Los Angeles.
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However, there was a report on Bush's

approval rating which indicated that 41 percent o f the population approved o f how he was
doing his job (23). His foreign policy approval rating was at 55 percent (43) and 21
percent o f Americans were satisfied with "the way things are going in the United States"
(47). The April issue also had nothing specific about Los Angeles, and Bush's overall

64
performance rating remained relatively steady at 42 percent with 48 percent disapproving
and 10 percent with no opinion (21).

These polls dramatically illustrate the pressure

Bush was under compared with his performance polls during the Persian Gulf crisis when
he had approval ratings over 70 percent.
The May 1992 issue did include questions about the Los Angeles riots. Bush's
overall job performance continued to fall with a 41 percent approval rating and a 52
percent disapproval rating, now the majority view (29). On issues related directly to the
Los Angeles riots, race became a key factor in the survey response results. Forty-three
percent o f white voters rated race relations as an important issue compared with 82
percent o f black voters (10). Thirty-seven percent o f whites and 17 percent o f blacks
thought Bush was doing enough to guarantee equal justice (10). Concerning the specific
issue o f the Rodney King verdict and the outbreak o f violence in Los Angeles, 71 percent
o f blacks, 68 percent o f non-whites and 48 percent of whites disapproved o f Bush's
handling o f that situation (15). These statistics clearly illustrate the negative attitudes of
the public that Bush had to face with each speech he delivered during this crisis.
This background information concerning the persuasive field suggests that Bush's
rhetorical success was greater during the international crises studied than during the
domestic crises. In particular, he faced two key constraints during the Los Angeles Riots
crisis that presented additional challenges as he tried to build public support for his
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actions. One was the fact that he was facing his lowest approval ratings in the midst o f a
presidential campaign, and the other was his negative image among non-White
Americans. These, and other factors presented in this section, will be included in the
discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
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CHAPTER THREE

BUSH’S RHETORICAL STYLE AND STRATEGY

Hart's Rhetorical Situation Model is a useful tool for understanding George Bush's
rhetorical strategy. The speeches examined for this thesis offered a great deal o f data for
analysis and discussion of four of Hart's elements —speaker, audience, topic and setting.
A discussion o f each of those elements follows. There are two other elements in Hart's
model -- persuasive field and medium. The data collected concerning the element o f
persuasive field was discussed in Chapter 2 and is incorporated into the discussion o f all
the other elements. Medium is not analyzed in this thesis because the data did not
suggest any unique use of the media. As might be expected, television and radio were the
media for national addresses, and all other remarks were delivered in person to various
audiences.24
In order to define and discuss George Bush's strategy and style, I examined the
language o f his speeches and identified examples that reflected rhetorical strategies
described in Chapter 1 of this thesis. After studying 44 speeches given by George Bush
during crisis situations —both domestic and international —I found that the dominant
rhetorical strategy employed by Bush was his use o f widely accepted values to define the
situation and to direct the public's focus. I found that Bush used values-based rhetoric
very effectively to highlight his role as the nation's leader and to establish common
ground with his audiences. However, I also found several occasions when Bush's halting
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delivery and trite language weakened his message . In this chapter, I will provide
examples and discussion of his crisis rhetoric that reflect both the strengths and
weaknesses o f his rhetorical strategy and style.
I have organized the discussion within the framework o f Hart's model, focusing
on the elements of speaker, audience, topic and setting, with special attention to Bush's
use of values to persuade his audience toward his point of view. In the section on the
element o f speaker, I illustrate how Bush tried to establish himself as a legitimate leader
based on personal values and his competency. The section on audience explores Bush's
use of rhetoric to establish common ground with audiences primarily by focusing on
social, religious and democratic values. In the topic section I discuss how Bush used
values-based rhetoric to focus the attention of the audience on his chosen agenda. The
section on setting centers on Bush's choices for the locations o f his remarks and how
those choices supported social values that contributed to his messages.

The Rhetorical Element of Speaker
When Hart's Rhetorical Situation Model is used for rhetorical criticism, the
researcher looks for indications of elements that dominate the discourse. In studying
George Bush's crisis rhetoric, I found that the element o f speaker was dominant. Through
his discourse, Bush called attention to himself, constantly defining his role as the nation's
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legitimate leader. This was an important rhetorical strategy because for Bush to
successfully persuade the public to support his chosen actions in crisis situations, he
needed to create a public perception that confirmed his position o f national leadership.
Always building his message around values-based rhetoric, Bush used two rhetorical
strategies to establish his legitimacy as the nation's leader in crisis situations. First he
defined his role in terms o f personal values, and second, he built his image o f competency
by presenting detailed information about the crisis gathered from credible sources such as
international leaders, members of his cabinet or other national, state and local government
leaders. I found arguments based on personal values in every speech in which the crisis
was the main topic. However, when Bush was speaking on a topic other than the crisis,
he limited his crisis-related remarks to short briefings o f factual information. Detailed
information from credible sources was evident in Bush's speeches concerning the Panama
Invasion, Persian Gulf and Los Angeles Riots crises, but not in the discourse concerning
the Flag Desecration crisis. Unlike the Flag Desecration crisis, the other three situations
involved military action and gave Bush the opportunity to talk about the activity o f his
team of government and military personnel. During the Flag Desecration crisis, he really
had no team because there was no action involving the military so his rhetoric was
entirely values-based.
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Before discussing the element o f speaker and George Bush's use o f personal
values, some background information may be useful. Although this thesis does not
present a psychological analysis o f George Bush's use of language, it is valuable to
understand the boyhood source o f Bush's strong sense of personal responsibility for the
preservation of American social and political values. In an article in Newsweek magazine
on August 20, 1990, the authors discussed how Bush's boarding school education was
reflected in his decisions concerning military action. In June, 1940, Colonel Henry
Stimson, Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary o f War, addressed the students at Phillips
Academy. Among them was 16-year old George Bush. Stimson told his audience that
"they had the 'opportunity' to choose between 'right and wrong,' to stand up for good
against evil" (33). According to the article, Henry Stimson was George Bush's hero
because he stood for the values Bush's family had taught him -- to be self-reliant and to
fight to defend America (33). Although that article was written as a background piece
concerning Bush's actions in the Persian Gulf, the lessons Bush received from Henry
Stimson are reflected in all o f the crisis rhetoric examined for this thesis, most
particularly in the self-definition o f his legitimate role as the nation's leader.

Establishing legitimacy through personal values

It is easy to find evidence o f Bush's

personal values in his crisis rhetoric. Using language that was direct and simple, he left
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no doubt in the minds of audiences that with each crisis, George Bush was personally
reviewing the situation and making decisions for the good of the nation. Bush's rhetoric
reflected personal confidence that he was, in fact, the legitimate leader of the nation, and
he defined his role of President as his personal and patriotic responsibility based on his
personal code o f ethics.
Bush's speeches during the Panama Invasion and the Los Angeles crises contained
examples o f his statements of personal responsibility stemming from his role as president.
For example, when he ordered the invasion o f Panama, Bush stated, "I have no higher
obligation than to safeguard the lives o f American citizens" (1989, 1723). Upon his
arrival in Los Angeles, Bush confirmed his personal obligation as the nation's leader
when he stated, "It was important, I feel, that as President, I come here to Los Angeles"
(1992, 732). Again speaking about the riots, he stated, "I think of the oath I took as
President, the Constitution's charge to ensure domestic tranquillity..." (1992, 705).
Following the riots he said, "I will do my level-best to heal the wounds and bring people
together ... A President should do no less" (1992, 676). In these statements, Bush
shouldered the entire burden of each crisis situation simply because it was his prescribed
duty as president.
During remarks concerning the constitutional amendment on the desecration o f
the flag, Bush also took a very personal and powerful role. He emphasized his respect for

the Justices o f the Supreme Court, but disagreed with their decision. Undaunted by the
status o f the Supreme Court of the United States, Bush, as the legitimate leader of the
nation, stated, "as President, I will uphold our precious right to dissent. But burning the
flag goes too far and I want to see that matter remedied" (1989, 805). His meaning was
very clear. As President, he would stand in opposition to the Supreme Court, and his
viewpoint held every bit as much, if not more power than that o f the Supreme Court.
They could make their decisions, but on this one, they were wrong and he was going to
see to it that it was set right. This is a clear illustration of how Bush's actions were based
on his personal values which dictated his decisions as president.

Establishing legitimacy by establishing competency

While Bush's rhetoric based on

personal values certainly contributed to his image as a legitimate leader, it may not have
been persuasive as his sole argument for public support because it was based on his
personal code o f ethics, not on his expertise concerning the situation at hand.

James C.

McCroskey notes that strength based on legitimacy stems from an assigned role, such as
president, and will not endure (81). A strong leadership position requires the audience's
perception that the speaker is competent to fill that leadership role (McCroskey, 80-81).
Factors that contribute to a speaker's competency include language that reflects evidence
of personal expertise and the incorporation of information from highly placed sources
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(McCroskey 76). Bush incorporated both of these factors extensively in his crisis
rhetoric.

Competency demonstrated by personal expertise

Bush's rhetorical technique of

reporting detailed facts o f the situation gave him an aura of expertise about each crisis.
Much like a journalist reporting the "who, what, when, where, why and how" of a news
story, George Bush generally began his remarks with a brief, but detailed report of the
current status o f the crisis situation. He included a chronological report o f events and
actions, a list of who he had spoken with (not necessarily anything on what they had
said), and a reiteration o f the government's goals.
For example, in his announcement of the Panama Invasion: "Last Friday, Noriega
declared a state of war...the next day (he) shot and killed an unarmed American
serviceman...last night I ordered forces into Panama...this morning I want to tell you what
I did and why" (1989, 1723) This chronological presentation gave the audience key
information immediately and efficiently while it supported the perception that Bush, as
the nation's leader, had command o f minute by minute updates concerning the crisis.
Bush used this speaking style in both international crises studied and to a lesser degree,
during the Los Angeles crisis. It was not evident in his speeches concerning the Flag
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Desecration Amendment, probably because Bush's strength was in reporting military or
law enforcement activities and that crisis was mostly a war of words.
Bush used this brief style o f reporting detailed information in nearly every
speech, but when he was addressing the press, brief remarks were the substance o f his
remarks in keeping with the nature o f the press as an audience. Out o f 17 speeches to
the press, only two went beyond a briefing o f the situation to include values-based
discourse common in his speeches to national and special interest audiences. One was a
press conference the day after the Panama Invasion. The other was remarks to the press
on his arrival in Los Angeles after the riots. It is likely that in these two instances, Bush
was purposely speaking beyond his primary audience, the press, to reach his national
audience through the media. This ability o f Bush's to tailor his remarks to his audiences
will be considered at length in the next section.
Sometimes Bush carried his demonstration of expertise too far and seemed to be
bragging. For example, during the Persian Gulf crisis, as he described the military
operations, he told reporters, "For those who are unfamiliar with the complexity o f an
operation of this nature, you ought to study it and learn from it because it was an
amazingly well coordinated, superbly executed operation" (1989, 1739). This tone in
which he seemed to set himself above his audience and point out their ignorance may
have actually diminished his leadership position in some people's eyes.
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Competency demonstrated by highly placed associations

Bush elevated his role as the

nation's legitimate and competent leader by promoting his role as a leader among national
experts and among leaders o f other nations. When Bush listed the names o f leaders who
were conferring with him on the various crisis situations, he placed himself not only
within that highly regarded circle, but at the center of all diplomatic and military activity.
He even expanded his realm of personal responsibility, creating the image o f a global
leader who, as President o f the United States, shouldered responsibility for the political
and social values o f freedom and democracy for the entire world.
This was most evident during the Persian Gulf crisis when Bush's rhetoric
reflected a position of strength on a global level as he led international diplomatic
discussions and directed courses of action toward mutual goals. His remarks often began
with a laundry list of international leaders with whom he had recently spoken. For
example, "[This morning, I] talked with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan...," "President
Mitterrand with whom I've spoken...," "Chancellor Kohl, Margaret Thatcher...the NATO
alliance is thinking exactly the same way on this...," "...talked yesterday with Kuwait's
Amir...," and "tomorrow [we] meet in Washington with the Secretary General of
NATO..." (1990, 1100-1). In all of these remarks, Bush used the complete, formal title,
name and nation o f each leader with whom he had spoken. By using their most respectful

75
titles, Bush elevated their status, as well as his own, in the eyes o f the American public.
In contrast, his language about the conversations was casual and very familiar. For
example, "I just hung up, up there in Camp David, talking with Prime Minister
Mulroney" (1990, 1100). Such language conjures up a picture o f George Bush lounging
in his cabin at Camp David, having a friendly chat. On another occasion, he apologized
for keeping the attendees at the Annual Conference o f the Veterans o f Foreign Wars
waiting, but he had just gotten off the phone with President Ozal of Turkey (1990, 1147).
Such casual phrasing emphasized his personal comfort level as he held conversations
with highly placed individuals.
As the G ulf Crisis escalated, Bush continued to promote his global leadership
activity. On August 8 in his address to the nation, Bush stated that he had "spoken with
political leaders from the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the Americas..." (1990, 1108).
This rhetoric put Bush at the center of a worldwide communication network, but Bush
was organizing more than discussions, he was directing the decisions. For example, after
listing all o f the leaders he had spoken with, he announced to the American public,
"...we're all in the same accord...to accept nothing less than total withdrawal from
Kuwait...and no puppet regime" (1990,1100-1). The statement indicated universal
agreement and Bush's presentation of the information placed him at the control center o f
all global diplomatic activity in that crisis situation. His discourse suggested virtually
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uninhibited global power when he stated, "I will ask oil producing nations to increase
production...to minimize any impact that oil flow reductions will have on the world
economy" (1990, 1109). These statements describing access to national leaders on every
continent and the confidence to personally ask oil-producing nations to do his bidding for
the good of the world economy certainly painted a picture o f powerful, legitimate,
competent leadership for the audience listening to that address.
There are also examples from the Panama Invasion crisis of Bush's use of rhetoric
to expand his leadership role to a global level, once again reflecting a competent leader
who was managing more than just a country —he was responsible for the future of the
entire hemisphere. In his press conference following the Panama Invasion, Bush noted,
with appreciation, the support o f Latin American countries (1989, 1728), and in his
remarks to the Republican National Committee on January 2, he called the success in
Panama "one more step toward a hemisphere that hopefully will be one day totally free,
totally democratic" (1990, 4). In other words, President Bush's actions in Panama were
not only in the best interests of the United States, but part o f a higher goal —to lead all of
Latin America to a free and democratic future.
Even during domestic crises, Bush broadened his realm o f responsibility to
include the entire globe. For example, in the Flag Desecration issue, Bush's choice of
words emphasized his role as not only the nation's leader, but a world leader. On June
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30, in his remarks announcing the constitutional amendment on desecration of the flag,
Bush noted that the flag was a symbol guaranteeing "civil rights here and democracy
abroad" (1989, 832).
In 1992, as the nation's leader, he broadened the impact of the Los Angeles crisis
to give it a national perspective, stating, "All communities in the United States need to
pause right now in the wake from tragic events in Los Angeles...from New York...to San
Antonio to San Jose, we must...build on our strengths" (1992, 692). Then, on May 8 in
Los Angeles, Bush took that domestic crisis to an international level, stating, "...everyone
around the world feels this trauma... every one who looks to us as a model o f freedom and
justice..." (1992, 730). To the community leaders in Los Angeles he said, "Our ability to
live and work together has really made America the inspiration to the entire world"
(1992, 733). With these words, Bush's trip to Los Angeles became an act o f the leader of
the free world, not just the United States.
Bush certainly depended to a great extent on the rhetoric o f legitimacy, but he also
spoke from a position of expert knowledge concerning the crisis situations and he made
numerous references to credible national and international sources. In this way, he
established himself not only as the nation’s legitimate leader, but as a global leader.
Having analyzed both aspects of Bush as the speaker —his use o f values and his
establishment of legitimacy, I found that in some of his speeches, Bush's style seemed to
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be dominated by his legitimate position as the nation's leader and in others, he
emphasized values. For example, his announcements o f military action during the two
international crises studied were very different in style and it is interesting to compare the
audience response to those different announcement styles. His announcement about the
Panama Invasion was dominated by legitimacy. It was very direct, assertive and almost
dictatorial in tone whereas his announcement about the Persian Gulf deployment was
humble, values-based rhetoric that included an appeal for public support. Comparing the
two opening paragraphs of those announcements illustrates the different tones:

Panama Invasion, address to the nation, December 20, 1989
My fellow citizens, last night I ordered U.S. military forces to Panama. No
President takes such action lightly. This morning I want to tell you what I
did and why I did it (1989, 1722).

Persian G ulf crisis, address to the nation, August 8, 1990
In the life of a nation, we're called upon to define who we are and what we
believe. Sometimes those choices are not easy. But today as President, I
ask for your support in a decision I've made to stand up for what's right
and condemn what's wrong, all in the cause o f peace (1990, 1107).
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The Panama Invasion announcement was a statement of fact that did not invite
public discussion. In contrast, the Persian Gulf statement was almost obsequious. In the
Panama situation, Bush made a firm statement that left no room for debate or
consideration o f other options. The Persian Gulf announcement opened on a softer tone
with an appeal for support. It was an attempt to bring the audience to a plane of
agreement and understanding based on patriotic and moral values.
As explained previously, I have chosen not to use this paper as a study of public
reaction to George Bush's crisis communication, but the different styles of these two
announcements of military action invite examination o f the persuasive field prior to and
following their delivery. Tables V and VI illustrate the Gallup Poll tracking of public
opinion in response to the question "Do you approve or disapprove of the way George
Bush is handling his job as President?" prior to and following his speeches announcing
the Panama Invasion on December 20, 1989 and the deployment of U.S. troops to the
Persian G ulf on August 8, 1990.

26

As the tables illustrate, Bush’s approval rating was

lower when he announced the Persian Gulf action that it was when he made his Panama
Invasion announcement. This lower approval rating and Bush’s likely anticipation that
the Persian G ulf crisis would involve a difficult, protracted military involvement may
explain his choice o f rhetorical style for that announcement.
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Table V: Bush's Approval Rating Before and After Panama Invasion Speech 27
Poll Taken:

Approve

Disapprove

No Opinion

December 7 - 1 0

71%

20%

9%

January 4 - 7

80%

11%

9%

Table VI: Bush's Approval Rating Before and After Deployment of Troops to Gulf
Poll Taken:

Approve

Disapprove

No Opinion

July 19 - 22

60%

25%

15%

August 16 - 19

75%

16%

9%

Bush's approval rate rose nine percentage points, from 71 percent to 80 percent in
the poll taken following his Panama Invasion announcement, but his approval rate rose
fifteen percentage points, from 60 percent to 75 percent following his announcement of
the deployment of troops to the Persian Gulf. Although I cannot draw any firm
conclusions from the greater increase following the Persian Gulf speech, it seems that the
less aggressive approach with an appeal for public approval may have been more
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effective with the audience. However, other factors in the persuasive field must be
considered. For example, there was very little media or public attention paid to the
Panama Invasion compared with the coverage of the deployment o f U.S. military troops
to the Persian Gulf (See Table VII). As a result, people were forming opinions about
Bush's remarks with at least the perception o f having more information about the
situation in the Persian Gulf situation than in Panama and thus possibly felt more
prepared to favorably support his decision to take military action.

Table VII: Weekly Newsmagazine Coverage of Panama Invasion and Gulf Crisis
1 week after crisis

2 weeks after
crisis

Panama Invasion

0 cover stories

1 cover story

0 related articles

6 related articles

Persian Gulf

2 cover stories

2 cover stories

Deployment

7 related articles

16 related articles

While this analysis of the interrelationship between the persuasive field and
Bush's style as a speaker may raise more questions than it answers, it does provide a more
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complete picture of President George Bush as a speaker and how he balanced his position
as the nation's legitimate leader with his understanding of audience values. The language
that Bush used concerning the Panama Invasion was spoken from a position of
legitimacy, confident of his decision to order military action and unconcerned about
public reaction. On the other hand, during his announcement of the military action in the
Persian Gulf, his language reflected a sense o f vulnerability in terms of his leadership
role. These differences in style illustrate that Bush had the rhetorical ability to play his
role as the nation's leader from an autocratic or a populist position, but the analysis o f the
persuasive field suggests that his audiences were more receptive to the latter.
During crises, it is important for the American public to perceive the president as
not only the legitimate leader, but a competent leader, able to make responsible decisions
in critical situations. It seems evident that Bush was able to establish his competency
through language that enhanced his role as a global leader with expert knowledge o f the
crisis situations, but, as the results of public opinion polls suggest, and as next section of
this thesis illustrates, Bush had to use more than personal values and expertise to
persuade his audiences to support his actions
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The Rhetorical Element of Audience
The study o f the rhetorical element o f audience is not an analysis of the audience,
but rather an examination of how the speaker uses discourse to create a relationship with
the audience. George Bush's challenge in this area was to establish common ground with
his audiences. He needed to focus on shared values and express himself with sincerity
and fluency. As the following discussion illustrates, I found that while George Bush used
his values-based discourse to establish common ground with his various audiences, he
occasionally seemed insincere or stumbled over his words, reducing the effectiveness of
his message.
For this section of the thesis, I divided Bush's audiences into three categories:
national, special interest and press, and then further categorized them by domestic and
international crises. During the time periods studied, Bush gave at least one national
address concerning each crisis, several lengthy addresses to special interest groups, and
many brief remarks directed to the press.28 (See Table VIII). Bush tailored his remarks
to each o f these audience types in order to persuade them that he shared their values, that
he understood their concerns and that he had expert knowledge of the situation. By doing
so, he established his position as a competent leader, making decisions in the best
interests o f the nation in each crisis situation.
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Table VIII: Speeches Delivered to Each Type of Audience for Each Crisis
Flag Burning

Panama

Persian Gulf

Invasion

Los
Angeles
Riots

0

1

1

2

Press

1

4

9

3

Special

2

3

4

14

National
Audience

Interest

Since Bush's primary rhetorical strategy was values-based rhetoric, it is not
surprising that nearly all of the arguments in his crisis speeches were built around widely
accepted democratic, social, religious or family values. However, I found that during the
two international crises and the domestic crisis concerning flag desecration, he focused
almost exclusively on democratic values such as freedom, patriotism and national unity.
During the other domestic crisis, the Los Angeles Riots, he drew on a much wider range
of values and I found it most interesting to study his remarks to special interest audiences
during that crisis because he addressed six different special interest audiences over a
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period o f two days. In preparing those speeches, he had his best opportunities to use
targeted persuasion directed at specific issues in order to build support and to establish
speaker/audience relationships. Bush exhibited real ability in this area as he tailored his
remarks to each audience -- establishing common ground to persuade them that he had
their best interests at heart. He knew that each group would have concerns about specific
issues and he was very skilled in addressing those issues, always framing his remarks
within his primary rhetorical strategy of using values-based rhetoric.
In the following sections, I have provided a selection of statements from each
crisis situation that illustrate Bush's use o f values to create common ground with his
audiences and, at the end, I provide a detailed discussion of his rhetorical approach to his
various Los Angeles audiences.

Establishing common ground with audiences during international crises

While

democratic values were common to all of Bush's crisis rhetoric, patriotism and freedom
were the heavy focus of his remarks during the international crises studied. During the
Panama Invasion , he stated "[we're] starting the year with a free Panama —one more step
toward a hemisphere that hopefully will be one day totally free, totally democratic"
(1990, 4). With these remarks, he reinforced a basic American value that the best
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societies are democratic societies. Thanks to his actions, Panama could now join the
ranks o f democracy.
However, Bush's remarks during the Panama Invasion Crisis were not designed to
bring people together, promoting national unity, something he did extensively in his
domestic crisis remarks. In fact, his remarks during the Panama Crisis seemed almost to
exclude the American public. The only appeal Bush made for any sort o f public support
was during remarks to Republicans at a barbecue in Beeville, Texas when he said, "We
will do everything we can to lift them [Panama] up...to give them a shot at democracy
that some o f us take for granted every single day... And so, let's all pitch in and try to
make it work" (1989, 1744). Even when he praised the soldiers who fought in the
Panama Invasion, he set himself and the soldiers apart from the audience when he said,
"You get the feel o f their patriotism and their courage" (1989, 1750). With these words
he implied that the audience could have a vicarious experience, but could not share those
feelings o f patriotism with himself and the soldiers. While these comments call for a type
of teamwork, they hardly equal the call for national unity that was evident in his remarks
in the other three crisis situations studied. This may have been due to the fact that the
invasion was kept secret and concluded fairly quickly, so Bush was not required to
persuade the public to support his actions. There was no need for national unity since
there was nothing for the nation to unite behind.
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On the other hand, from his first remarks to the nation announcing the deployment
o f troops to Saudi Arabia, the audience was a part of the action. He announced, "We
succeeded in the struggle for freedom in Europe because we and our allies remained
stalwart.'1(1990, 1109). He added,11Standing up for our principle is an American
tradition...it may take time and tremendous effort, but most of all it will take unity of
purpose11(1990, 1109). These remarks drew on the values o f national pride and unity
that the nation shared during World Wars I and II. As Bush made this rhetorical link
from one generation o f patriotic Americans to another, his credibility and his competence
as a leader were enhanced. By including the entire national audience in this struggle for
freedom, led by George Bush, World War II veteran and the nations Commander-inChief, he established common ground and his expertise -- a brilliant combination that
certainly resulted in public support for his decisions in this crisis situation.
However, sometimes Bush's crisis rhetoric was dulled by his inability to sound
sincere. For example, Bush attempted to establish himself as a compassionate leader
during the Panama Invasion, but his style was stiff and he sometimes sounded insensitive
in his efforts at empathy. On December 27, 1989, one week after the invasion, he made
the following remarks, 11And I should say here and now: O f course we grieve at the loss
o f young American life. And frankly, I grieve at the loss o f innocent Panamanian life,
caught up in this battle. But at times, you have to make a decision: What is in the national

interest/ What is right? What is the right signal to send to the world? (1989, 1744)"
Words like "I should say" and "frankly, I grieve" lack sincerity, and Bush's sympathy for
•

•

those who died was diluted by his overriding concern for the nation's image.

Establishing common ground with audiences during domestic crises

29

In his domestic

crisis rhetoric, Bush used two different approaches in terms o f values as he worked to
establish common ground with his audiences. His speeches in Los Angeles drew on a
wide range o f values: democratic, social, religious and family values. However,
democratic values such as unity, national pride, equality and patriotism were the sole
focus of Bush's remarks during the Flag Desecration crisis. In his remarks, he listed all of
the democratic values symbolized by the flag, stating, "Our flag represents freedom and
the unity o f our nation ... We can't forget the importance of the flag to the ideals of
liberty, honor and freedom" (1989, 832). His comments stressing national unity were
quite poetic, "the flag represents and reflects the fabric of our nation...our very fiber as a
people" (1989, 832). All of these references to freedom and unity reinforced values basic
to American democratic society. By using them to support his actions concerning the
issue o f flag desecration, Bush enhanced his image as a competent leader, representing
what he clearly believed were the best interests of the American people, but it did not
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provide much opportunity for him to target audiences and develop a relationship with
them on this issue that would bring the support he needed for his chosen position.
On the other hand, the Los Angeles riots provided a unique arena in which to
examine Bush's efforts to establish common ground with several special interest
audiences. (See Table IX). Because the six speeches involved a single crisis situation and
were delivered over a two-day period, they provide a unique, composite picture of Bush's
strengths and weaknesses in terms o f the rhetorical element of audience. Bush began his
series of Los Angeles addresses in the African-American community, speaking to
congregants at Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church. Afterward he spoke with
African-American community leaders and then with leaders o f the Korean community.
The second day he began with remarks to firefighters and law enforcement personnel,
followed by a speech to military and law enforcement personnel and finally, remarks to
Los Angeles community leaders.
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T able IX: B ush's Special Interest Audiences in Los Angeles, May 7 and 8,1992
Type of Audience

Location

Focus of R em arks

African-American

Mt. Zion Missionary

Social values, family values

Baptist Church
African-American

Mt. Zion Missionary

Government action in rebuilding

Baptist Church

community; civil rights
investigation

Korean-American

Firefighters and Law

Radio Korea Broadcast

Government action in rebuilding

Studio

community; American dream

Firestation No. 26

Praise for public safety

Enforcement
Military and Law

personnel
Los Angeles Coliseum

Enforcement
Community Leaders

Praise for law enforcement and
military personnel

Challenger Boys and

Failure of existing social

Girls Club

programs, Bush's economic
agenda
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Audience #1: Mt. Zion Missionary Baptist Church

The audiences on the first day

were all members o f communities that had been the sites of the rioting. Many were
victimized by the rioting in terms of physical harm, emotional trauma and loss of
property. The main focus of Bush's remarks to these groups was the importance of social,
religious and family values. He urged restraint and patience as the various government
agencies went about their work restoring order and rebuilding the communities.
However, Bush was able to fine-tune his remarks to be even more specific with
each of these victimized audiences. For example, when he spoke to the Mt. Zion Baptist
Church congregation, his remarks were filled with references to religious and family
values. He stressed the need for compassion, sending "a message o f forgiving and
healing" (1992, 715). These would be familiar words spoken in a church and because
Bush used this very fitting language with this audience, it made him appear more
competent as a leader. When Bush reminded them that "We are one Nation under God"
(1992, 715), and that "...faith is still very important to our leaders" (1992, 716), he
aligned him self and all government leaders with the members o f the congregation,
establishing solid common ground. Appealing to the familial nature of religious
congregations, he added, "We need our own family. We need our church family. And we
must find ways to strengthen America as a family" (1992, 715). These words underlined
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the religious and family values of the congregational audience and clearly put Bush in a
positive position to ask for their support of his leadership.
Bush used his own family to further illustrate the importance to him of family
values. He described his family's reaction to the Rodney King verdict, "Everyone was
stunned ~ me, Barbara, my kids" (1992, 685-686). This personal revelation was a direct
link between himself and every head-of-household in that congregation who felt
personally offended by the verdict. Then he shared with the congregants his family's
method for promoting family values, explaining, "when Barbara reads to kids..she is
emphasizing...the importance o f the role of grandparents...the importance of love (1992,
715). These warm and personal remarks about religion and family were an important
strategy in trying to establish common ground with the African-American community and
win their support for his actions concerning the crisis.

Audience #2: Leaders o f the African-American Community

Later that morning,

when Bush spoke to the African-American community leaders, he changed the focus of
his remarks from religion and family in order to address issues most salient to that group,
specifically what government was doing to rebuild the community and the progress of a
federal civil rights investigation into the Rodney King verdict. In so doing, Bush
highlighted his expertise concerning the situation in an effort to enhance his competency
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with this group. As he spoke, Bush presented them with a list of government agencies
and directors who were working with local and state government agencies to begin the
rebuilding. Using the rhetorical strategy to promote his legitimacy discussed earlier in
this chapter, the list read like a team lineup, "...under David Kearns they've put together a
good task force...FEMA...Jack Kemp's HUD, Lou Sullivan's HHS...leading the fray was
Pat Saiki, out here very early for the SB A..." (1992, 717). With these remarks, Bush
demonstrated his awareness that as leaders of the African-American community, his
audience would be most interested in what action was being taken to address the
problems in their neighborhoods. By providing specific, detailed information, Bush
chose an effective strategy with this group, establishing his expert knowledge and
handling of the situation. He attempted to establish common ground with the group by
appealing to such social values as teamwork and unity, asking that they do their part to
calm the African-American community while he did his part as the leader o f the national
government's action squad.
Bush seemed to use a very effective combination of values and expertise to
establish common ground with his African-American audiences and he added some
compassion to the mix that in some cases could even be described as passionate. For
example, during his address to the nation on May 1, he expressed deep feelings
concerning the Rodney King beating, stating, "What I saw on the video was revolting. I
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felt anger. I felt pain. I thought: How can I explain this to my grandchildren?" (1992,
685). These remarks were a validation o f the feelings of angry people nationwide and
may have created a bond with African-Americans. However, when he spoke directly to
the African-American community in Los Angeles, he stumbled over his words and
seemed uncomfortable, as if he were groping for a coherent statement, "...we will follow
through with any responsibilities under the law...to see if civil rights of anybody have
been violated, King or anybody, Rodney King or anyone else, that there be fair play and
equity there" (1992, 717). The disjointed structure o f this statement and the repetition o f
the words "King" and "anybody" may have affected how the message was received by his
audience. He may have sounded desperate, trying too hard to convince his audience, or
he may have been interpreted as having strongly passionate feelings about this issue. If
the audience perceived Bush as a supporter o f civil rights, then deeply held passion
would be their likely view of his awkward remarks. However, if Bush was perceived as
not being highly supportive of civil rights, his stumbling over the words could be
interpreted as language he was having trouble spitting out. Examination o f public
opinion polls taken from May 7 to May 10 sheds some light on the persuasive field
during the time that the African-American audience was receiving Bush's message in Los
Angeles on May 7 (See Table X).
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Table X: Issues Polled Among Non-White Population from May 7 to 10,1992
(Gallup Poll Monthly, May 1992)
82% saw race relations as an important issue
17% thought Bush was doing enough to guarantee equal justice
71% disapproved of Bush's handling of events following King verdict

The Gallup Poll Monthly for May 1992 reported that in public opinion polls taken
from May 7 to 10 following the Los Angeles riots, 82 percent o f black voters rated race
relations as an important issue, only 17 percent o f blacks thought Bush was doing enough
to guarantee equal justice, and 71 percent of blacks disapproved o f the way Bush handled
the events following the King verdict and the riots (12, 15). The results of the polls
suggest that Bush was not extremely successful in convincing the non-white communities
o f his competence in this crisis.

Audience #3: Leaders o f the Korean Community

In his third speech of the day in Los

Angeles, when Bush spoke to leaders of the Korean community, Bush changed his focus
once again. The Korean community's greatest loss in the riots was damage to businesses
and Bush centered his remarks on this issue, knowing that help in rebuilding their
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businesses would be the key salient issue for this community. As with the AfricanAmerican community leaders, he successfully covered the government's actions
concerning issues that were of concern to the Korean community.
However, Bush missed the mark in establishing common ground with this
audience. While he appealed to the African-American leaders to work with him as a
team, he segregated the Korean community by highlighting their immigrant background.
For example, he spoke about those who came to America from Korea and "grabbed a
piece o f the American dream." (1992, 719). Then Bush set an almost adversarial tone
when he stated, "We have to convince these people that the American dream is for real"
(1992, 720). This language did nothing to establish common ground with the Korean
community or enhance that population's attitude that his actions were in their best
interest.
Bush may have created some negative feelings in this audience when he stated, "I
look at this in a very broad sense, not only in terms of families that were hurt but in terms
of international. I think most people here will concede and rejoice in the fact that we have
good relations with Korea...I will do everything I can to show our friends abroad as well
as here that it's not the American way" (1992, 719). This language was very self-centered
as Bush once again promoted his own role as a global leader. Furthermore, although this
message may have resonated for members of the community who retain strong ties to
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Korea, many of them came to the United States as long as 25 years ago. Such longtime
residents may have resented being told what "the American way" is since they probably
considered themselves Americans. In fact, some of the community leaders may have
come as children and lived all of their adult lives in America. In overemphasizing the
idea of "the American way," Bush may have enhanced his world leader image with this
rhetoric, but in so doing, he may, in fact, have alienated a portion o f his audience who
thought of themselves as Americans with a Korean heritage.
On the other hand, Bush certainly enhanced his competence with the Korean
leadership as he addressed specific complaints that had been raised in the Korean
community about the rebuilding efforts. He used a very direct, action-based approach,
listing the concerns and the specific actions being taken. Such statements included, "I
understand that some in the community...were unhappy by the location o f the disaster
relief center. And by early next week... we are going to have a new, acceptable location.
And I understand that not having forms in Korean is a problem...We also realize that
translators are a problem...We have an 800 assistance number that will receive calls in six
languages" (1992, 720). These statements strengthened Bush's position as a leader and
indicated that he had a clear understanding o f their needs. Organizing relief efforts for
the community would certainly have been much more important to the Korean leadership
than whether Bush shared their community values, so it seems likely that even though
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Bush was not effective in establishing any common ground with his audience, there was
no damage done to his competency level.

Audiences #4 and #5: Police, Firefighters and Military Personnel

During his second

day o f speaking in the Los Angeles area, Bush's audiences changed. Instead o f speaking
to victims o f the riots, he spoke to the city officials and professionals who were
responsible for actions taken to stop the riots, including the firefighters, law enforcement
personnel and military personnel.

These audiences were more homogeneous than those

o f the previous day and his speeches to all three groups contained similar language. His
opening remarks included lists of names o f individuals who deserved thanks and lists of
facts about the violence, such as the number o f fires and the number of arrests. This type
o f rhetoric illustrated his expert knowledge o f the crisis and enhanced his competency
with these groups. Then he used social values such as patriotism and selflessness to
establish common ground with the audiences. He offered words of high praise for the
public safety and military professionals as he related in-depth anecdotal stories o f acts o f
heroism during the riots. He even drew on religious values with these audiences by
stating, "At a time like this you think o f your faith..." and quoting the Biblical passage
"Blessed are the peacemakers..." (1992, 727). With this effective balance o f establishing
his expertise and sharing their social, political and religious values, Bush certainly
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enhanced his competency as a leader in the eyes o f his public safety and military
audiences in Los Angeles.

Audience #6: Los Angeles Community Leaders

During the speech to his last special

interest audience in Los Angeles, a group of community leaders, Bush stated, "We must
not let our diversity destroy us...it is central to our strength as a Nation" (1992, 733). He
applauded those who "reached across the barrier of color to save lives" (1992, 735, 744).
Bush continued to emphasize social values, but he began to choose language that
broadened the focus of the crisis to include the failure o f government social programs in
general. He stressed democratic values, particularly equality, stating, "[we will] discuss
our common commitment to justice, civil tranquillity and the rule o f the law" (1992, 680)
Because the triggering events of the Los Angeles riots involved racial issues, his focus
on the democratic value of equality were those o f a competent leader. His remarks
assured his audiences that he understood their concerns and, having established that
common ground, urged them to work together for the common good of the nation. Few
people could argue with those statements o f national unity, and they were certainly in
concert with Bush's actions regarding the crisis —meeting with community leaders in Los
Angeles, providing government aid for riot victims, and then presenting his agenda for
changes in social services. Such a blend of effective rhetoric and supporting action
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helped create the perception of a thoughtful, action-based, leader -- a competent leader.
Although Bush had stated his desire to keep the campaign out o f the discussions with his
Los Angeles audiences, this speech was clearly an effort to gain support for his economic
agenda. It is perhaps to his credit however, that in the midst o f a difficult presidential
campaign, this was, in fact, the only one of the six speeches to special interest audiences
that sounded like a campaign speech.
Overall, Bush used sound rhetorical strategy in his efforts to establish common
ground with his audiences. He used values-based language that they could identify with
and he spoke with confidence about his expertise in the crisis situations. However, Bush
may have had some trouble establishing rapport with his audience in terms o f compassion
and empathy, so while his crisis rhetoric contributed to his image as a competent leader,
that image was tarnished by his failure to express himself as a compassionate leader.

The Rhetorical Element of Topic
As I discussed in Chapter 1 o f this thesis, crisis rhetoric provides presidents with
opportunities to define crisis situations and to direct discourse about the crisis so that it
supports the president's agenda. Bush's remarks to various audiences clearly indicated his
strength in identifying and addressing topics o f interest to his special interest audiences.
Even on those occasions when he failed to express compassion, Bush was able to
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establish a relationship with his audience that allowed him to control the topic of his
remarks and to a great degree, direct the audience's focus of attention. During two o f the
crises studied, the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Los Angeles Riots, Bush was able to
promote his political agenda within the boundaries of his remarks, continuing to use the
strategy o f values-based rhetoric. Speeches made during the Gulf Crisis provided him
with opportunities to discuss the topic o f military spending and promote his defense
agenda, and the Los Angeles riots provided opportunities to promote his economic and
social reforms agenda.
Table XI: Agenda Focus During Bush's Crisis Speeches
Speeches on

Speeches on Social and

Defense Agenda

Economic Reforms
Agenda

Panama Invasion

6

0

Flag Desecration

1

0

Persian Gulf

11

0

Los Angeles Riots30

14

12
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Defense Agenda

During the Gulf Crisis, Bush took the opportunity to acknowledge the

need for restructuring the military and to stress the importance of maintaining a strong
military force. On August 2, a week before the deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi
Arabia, Bush was already using the crisis situation to argue for his defense agenda.
Speaking at the Aspen Institute Symposium, he delivered a lengthy, detailed speech on
how to restructure U.S. defense as the Cold War was coming to an end. His remarks
included details about what would be necessary to be prepared to respond to international
aggression. During the week immediately following the deployment of troops, Bush
focused on informing the American public about the decisions being made and actions
being taken, but he soon returned to his defense agenda. On August 15, when he spoke to
the Department of Defense Employees, he again alluded to the changing role o f the
military, saying, "I am relying on you to shape the forces of the future, to preserve peace
and freedom in the face of new threats and new dangers" (1990, 1139). In a speech at the
Annual Conference of the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 20, he said the military
activity in the Persian Gulf had reaffirmed lessons about America's defense and he stated,
"Although the size o f America’s Armed Forces in the years ahead will be smaller because
the threat to our security is changing...we will remain purposeful, proud, and
effective... Just look at the last 18 days. Desert Shield has been a classic case o f America's
military at its best...a reduction of numbers does not mean a reduction in American
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strength...when it comes to national defense, finishing second means finishing last"
(1990, 1149-50). With these remarks, Bush was taking full advantage uf tlie military
successes in the Persian Gulf in order to build public support for a strong military.
In addition to promoting his defense agenda, Bush used his speaking opportunities
during all o f the crises studied to raise the public awareness and enhance the image o f the
military. His statements o f praise for the fighting soldiers were effusive. During the
Panama Invasion crisis, he praised the "courageous and selfless" troops (1989, 1722) who
did a "first class job.” Sounding like a proud parent, he told supporters at a barbecue in
Beeville, Texas, that it was the "darnedest coordination you've ever seen between
helicopter gunships and little —we call them Little Bird helicopters —in the air all at the
same time" (1989, 1744).
Bush cited the bravery and outstanding service of military personnel as
justification for his defense agenda. During the Persian Gulf crisis, he praised "...men
and women in the Armed Forces [who] have performed with extraordinary ability...and
dedication to duty" (1990, 1157). He pledged, "I will never send young men and women
in to battle with less than the very best this nation can provide them. I will never - - 1 will
never, ever -- let Americans like this down" (1989, 1150). During the Gulf crisis, at a
Republican Party fund raising luncheon on August 20, he could not seem to say enough
about those serving in the military. Noting that America must meet its obligation to
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preserve peace, he said, "...we have the finest young men and women that the service has
ever had, an all-volunteer Army, all-volunteer force, if you will, and the finest young kids
ever, suited up and serving. So, it is this obligation that brave men and women are
shouldering today in Saudi Arabia -- the finest—finest men and women" (1990, 1154).
This rhetorical strategy linked the present military situation in the Gulf with the Panama
Invasion which Bush had directed successfully and it established the premise that this
caliber of personnel deserved the best that defense spending could buy.
Bush also used domestic crises to further his defense agenda whenever possible.
In Los Angeles, he told military and law enforcement personnel, "I will remain the
President who strongly supports the law enforcement community in this country and who
strongly supports our military" (1992, 729). However, he was able to use the element o f
topic most effectively in Los Angeles to promote his domestic agenda

Economic and Social Reform Agenda

Just as the Gulf War provided fertile ground for

Bush to nurture the seeds o f his defense agenda, the Los Angeles riots, occurring as the
presidential campaign was in full swing, gave Bush the platform to promote his domestic
agenda for the reform o f economic and social programs. He did not waste any time in
linking the crisis to his rhetorical campaign on this topic. In his early remarks concerning
the riots he said that there are people "caught up in a tragic cycle o f poverty and despair.
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But the answer...is peaceful and thoughtful change" (1992, 676). Bush quickly
established the government's role with his first speech at Mt. Zion Baptist Church when
he told the congregation what their role was in his proposed social change, the church's
parental role in teaching right from wrong and strengthening families, noting that "Family
values means the church must continue to teach the kids right from wrong...Government
can't do that" (1992, 715). This is a good example of how Bush used his rhetorical
strategy to direct attention away from any possible government responsibility for the
crisis and back to the local neighborhoods. In several addresses during the following days
he spoke about the need for change, "We must bring hope and opportunity to our inner
cities...The Federal government has a...fundamental role in ending poverty and despair"
(1992, 713). In Los Angeles, he used a roundtable discussion with African-American
leaders to bring them into the reform process, "...what I really would like to get is the
heartbeat of the community...I want to hear from you...as to what you think we can do,
and please speak frankly about it" (1992, 717). Then, in his last appearance in Los
Angeles on May 8, he delivered a lengthy speech to community leaders outlining his
plans for social reform. He discussed the failure of the majority o f existing social
programs, saying, "Today I want to talk about what went wrong in Los Angeles" (1992,
730) and noting that the city cannot return to the status quo (1992, 731). He announced a
$19 million plan to "weed out criminals" and expand "educational, employment and
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social services" in the inner cities (1992, 732). He spelled out the roles of the community
leaders and the media in promoting change and even suggested that liability laws should
be changed as part of the reform because they "...frighten people away from helping
others. We ought to care for each other more and sue each other less" (1992, 734). In his
radio address to the nation the next morning, he restated the elements of his domestic
agenda, "preserve order...spark an economic revival...revolutionize American
education...promote home ownership" (1992, 735), and stated, "My first order o f business
now that I am back in Washington is to build a bipartisan effort in support of immediate
action on this agenda" (1992, 736). Then, on May 11, he expanded his agenda, adding
arguments on health care reform and still using the crisis in Los Angeles as the backdrop
for his remarks. At a fund raising dinner in Philadelphia he said, "...the time has come to
set the old, worn-out ideas aside" (1992, 744). To the press on May 12, he made a brief
reference to the agenda and said, "We talked about this up in Philadelphia yesterday and
in Los Angeles last week, and I think there's strong support for this program" (1992, 749).
At this point, Los Angeles had served its purpose as a segue into his topic o f choice. The
riots were no longer the primary link between the needs for economic and social reform
and Bush's agenda and he moved on to promote his programs with little or no reference to
Los Angeles.
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It is a powerful rhetorical tool to be able to direct public attention to a particular
topic and to use events of the day to promote a particular agenda. Bush did not waste
those opportunities. The data collected for this thesis revealed that whenever Bush
delivered remarks during the time periods studied, once he acknowledged the crisis at all,
he made it part, if not all of the topic in every speech.
He used crisis situations very effectively to promote his defense and domestic
agendas with one exception. That exception occurred on May 1, two days after the Los
Angeles riots broke out. He had issued his first remarks concerning the crisis the evening
before at a fund raising dinner. Then, on May 1, Bush delivered three speeches. The first
one at 7:04 a.m. was a scheduled speech to participants o f the Great American Workout.
Although his remarks concerning the crisis represented only a very small part of the
speech, he referred to the situation as one that "troubles the whole country" and
announced scheduled meetings with the Attorney General and the head of the FBI as well
as civil rights leaders. (1992, 680). The third speech that day was delivered at 9:03 p.m.
It was an address to the nation on the civil disturbances in Los Angeles. That was, o f
course, a lengthy speech outlining what action had been taken, asking people to remain
calm, and stressing the social values that would become the theme for his remarks on that
crisis. However, the second speech Bush delivered that day was at 1:25 p.m. at the Points
of Light Ceremony. In those remarks, he made no mention o f the riots at all. This
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peculiar omission cannot be explained by the type of audience. Both speeches were
delivered to special interest audiences. In fact, there were even appropriate places in the
remarks at the Points o f Light ceremony to reiterate the social values that he stressed in
his early morning speech because during the Points of Light ceremony Bush praised Los
Angeles award winner Robert Zamora, who created the "Getting Busy Teen Club as an
alternative to gangs in east Los Angeles" and the members o f the Eammanuel Reformed
Church in Paramount, California, who "started tackling the crises that threatened their
neighborhood, like gangs and illiteracy and crime" (1992, 682). It is hard to imagine that
the crisis did not come to mind as he praised these Los Angeles programs designed to
improve the situation in neighborhoods that had just been victimized by rioting,. In terms
of rhetorical strategy, one cannot help but wonder if the omission was intended, and if so,
to what end? If it was simply an oversight in the delivery of a speech written prior to the
outbreak o f the crisis it still seems odd that Bush remembered to inject remarks on the
rioting in his early morning speech and neglected to mention it during this speech at a
most appropriate juncture —presenting awards to Los Angeles citizens who were taking
action to create less hostile environments for those in the riot-torn areas.
Nonetheless, Bush certainly demonstrated that he had rhetorical skill in the use of
topic and built his verbal messages very effectively to direct audience attention to his
agenda. However, there are also nonverbal messages that contribute to effective rhetoric.
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In the next section, I discuss how Bush used the element of setting to further develop his
crisis rhetoric.

The Rhetorical Element of Setting
The way in which an audience receives any speech can be greatly impacted by the
setting. Remarks delivered in an inappropriate location may seem weak and may even be
misinterpreted. However, a location with the right nonverbal symbols in the background
can add powerful force to a message. I found that Bush used the symbols o f his office
when delivering speeches to national audiences. However, when possible, he took
advantage o f other locations to add impact to his remarks .
Table XII: Settings of Remarks
Flag Burning

1 at White House

2 at other locations 31

Panama Invasion

3 at White House

5 at other locations32

Persian Gulf

6 at White House

8 at other locations

Los Angeles Riots

6 at White House

13 at other locations

Many of Bush's remarks were made in Washington D.C. in a White House setting,
the architectural symbol of his authority as President. During both international crises
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studied, settings such as the Oval Office, the White House Briefing Room and the
Cabinet Room added credibility to the President's assurances that he was in touch with
world leaders and in command of the situation. It would have been unthinkable for him
to go to Panama or the Persian Gulf himself. Americans are accustomed to having their
President in the White House during an international crisis. Although the public does not
expect presidents to travel to sites of international crises, during domestic crises,
presidents can enhance their images o f competence, legitimacy and compassion by
personally visiting national sites o f crisis as soon as it is safe to do so.
George Bush chose the White House as the setting for about half o f his remarks
during crisis situations. His awareness of the symbolic value o f the White House was
evident the week before he deployed American troops to the Gulf when Bush had a
scheduled speaking engagement in Aspen, Colorado. In order to impress upon the public
that he was "on the job," he announced his schedule to reporters, "I will have
consultations...there in Aspen with Prime Minister Thatcher and I will be returning home
this evening, and I'll be here in Washington tomorrow" (1990, 1084). In other words, this
was not a pleasure trip and, as the nation's leader, he would return to his legitimate and
appropriate location -- Washington -- as quickly as business would allow.
During international crises, Bush did deliver several speeches away from the
White House, his symbolic center o f power, but many of the locations were associated
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with the government, such as the Pentagon and military bases. One location, Bush's
home in Kennebunkport, Maine, might have been technically considered a governmentassociated site, but because it was Bush's vacation home, it created a different nonverbal
message than the White House. Of the four crises studied, Bush delivered remarks from
Kennebunkport only during the Persian Gulf crisis, and I believe it was one o f the few
poor choices he made concerning the setting for his speeches. When Bush made
announcements from the comfort of his vacation home about the deployment of U.S.
troops to a war zone, he appeared detached from the situation and insensitive to those
who were personally affected by the military action that he had ordered.
On the other hand, Bush made some very good choices about setting, especially
during the domestic crises that allowed him the flexibility to travel to the site of the crisis
and personally assess the situation. George Bush was able to deliver his remarks
concerning the two domestic crises studied in locations that added power to his messages.
For example, after the Los Angeles riots, he spoke to the African-American
community in their neighborhood and the Korean community in their neighborhood.
Having the President of the United States come to see the damage first hand was much
more effective in building a relationships with those audiences than would have been
possible had he spoken to them from Washington or even from some other location in
Los Angeles.
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Perhaps the most powerful and fitting backdrop for his remarks was during the
flag burning crisis when Bush announced the proposed constitutional amendment on
desecration o f the flag. He delivered those remarks at the Iwo Jima Memorial. Few
locations could have punctuated his remarks more effectively than the familiar statue of
soldiers raising the flag at a memorial erected in memory o f those who died defending it.
In general, George Bush made good use of his location options to add emphasis to
his crisis communication. Logistical and safety reasons prevented Bush from delivering
remarks related to international situations at the location of the crisis, but during those
crises, he was consistent in his use of the White House and other presidential settings as
the backdrop for his remarks. Additionally, during the two domestic crises Bush took
advantage of opportunities to be "on the scene." In Los Angeles he stood amidst the
devastation created by the crisis and talked about how the government would help the
victims pick up the pieces of their lives, and in Washington he created a powerful visual
image when he stood before one inspiring national symbol, the Iwo Jima Memorial, as he
defended the significance o f another, the American flag.

Summary
While it is useful to examine each of the rhetorical elements and how Bush used
them in his crisis communication, it is the interaction o f those elements that results in the
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speaker's most persuasive messages. Bush clearly depended on his personal values to
develop his stature as a legitimate and credible leader, but he used the settings o f his
remarks to extend those images. Bush developed his role as a legitimate and competent
leader, and he was able to promote his agenda through the use of topic.
However, Bush did exhibit some vulnerability in terms o f developing audience
support, particularly during the Los Angeles riots crisis. When he delivered his remarks
to the riot victims in their own destroyed environments, he made strong use o f the
element o f setting, but he seemed to fall short as a competent leader operating from a
position o f strength. He was involved in a difficult political campaign at the time and
was burdened by a poor domestic economic situation, but his speaking style did not lend
itself to sympathetic, caring language and, in fact, he appeared awkward and
uncomfortable when he tried to deliver such remarks. His inability to express sympathy
and compassion made him appear stiff and insincere when placed in riot-torn
neighborhoods or military hospitals. The most reasonable, responsible decisions may be
rejected by an audience if there is a perception that action was taken with no empathy for
those affected by the decision. O f course, because public opinion varies, people often
disagree on whether leaders have made responsible, competent decisions in any given
situation. However, if leaders take the opportunity to establish a relationship o f common
ground with their audiences and give them a sense that the leadership's decisions were
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made with the audience's best interests at heart, the result is likely to be a positive attitude
concerning a speaker's competence (McCroskey, 75). Presidents whose rhetorical
strategic styles strengthen the audience perception of their competence are more likely to
achieve audience acceptance of their chosen actions in crisis situations.
Bush's crisis rhetoric was most powerful when the elements o f speaker, topic,
audience and setting interacted within the framework of his value system. Much o f
George Bush's rhetorical power emanated from his setting and he was simply more
effective speaking from the Oval Office than "in the trenches." Bush's rhetorical strategy
worked best when the topic lent itself to discourse based on the moral principles that were
integral to the speaker, George Bush; when the audience was a special interest group
whose values Bush could readily identify with; and when Bush could deliver his remarks
in a setting that enhanced his power as a world leader.
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CHAPTER FOUR

CRISIS RHETORIC AS A GENRE

My initial interest in presidential crisis communication stemmed from the
question o f whether such discourse was a rhetorical genre. The review of literature
discussed in Chapter 1 revealed some controversy about the question, and I approached
my analysis o f Bush's crisis communication with the various arguments in mind. While
some scholars offered very specific criteria defining the crisis rhetoric genre, others
denied its existence altogether. Communication scholars have identified other rhetorical
genre such as eulogies and inaugural addresses. Speeches that address those situations
follow certain patterns of structure and language that the audience can readily identify
which helps them understand the situations. The value in including a crisis rhetoric
among the various communication genre is based on the need for understanding between
presidents and their audiences during crisis situations. Like other recurring human
situations, crises call for rhetorical responses and the genre helps audiences and critics
evaluate whether the responses are fitting for the situations.
My first step in seeking support for a crisis rhetoric genre was to study Bush's
discourse in terms o f the requirements of a rhetorical genre as defined by Campbell and
Jamieson and Hart. Bush's crisis rhetoric clearly met those requirements, supporting the
argument that presidential crisis communication is indeed a rhetorical genre. His
speeches contained a consistent, identifiable pattern of style and strategy that allowed
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audiences to identify the purpose of the speeches and to anticipate the kind o f information
they would receive in order to make sense of the situation that prompted the president's
remarks.
When I examined Bush's rhetoric for evidence of the criteria specific to crisis
rhetoric genre as outlined by Cherwitz and Zagacki and Rasmussen, I found that their
approaches were too narrow to provide a useful definition o f crisis rhetoric genre. In the
following discussion, I provide arguments to support a list o f crisis rhetoric genre criteria
that includes some o f the elements of Cherwitz and Zagacki and Rasmussen's research,
but which extends beyond their limiting boundaries to establish a broader genre definition
that will be more useful to audiences and to communication scholars. Based on my
research, crisis rhetoric is a genre defined by the following characteristics:
1. Consistent, identifiable pattern of language style and strategy
2. Evidence of consummatory and / or justificatory language
3. Speaker indicates awareness o f global audience
4. Explanation of how action is in accordance with U.S. policy
5. Explanation o f how action is strategically sound and morally upright
6. Justification of action is based on widely accepted values o f audience
7. Evidence o f enemy themes
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Consistent, identifiable pattern of language style and strategy
Campbell and Jamieson's definition of genre argues that in such discourse,
identifiable elements will interrelate, providing a clear indication of the type o f situation
that prompted the discourse (20, 25). Hart's discussion includes a definition o f genre as a
group o f messages whose structure and content create certain expectations for the
audience (183). Based on those definitions, Bush's crisis communication supports the
genre argument. His speeches were dominated by the interrelationship o f two identifiable
elements: 1) his leadership role and 2) the values on which he based his arguments. His
speeches followed an identifiable pattern and were consistent in their structure. He began
with a list o f facts about the situation followed by the "why" of the situation using valuesbased, descriptive arguments. His rhetoric created certain expectations for his various
audiences —brief, factual information for the press and more descriptive discourse for his
special interest and national audiences that provided values-based explanations and
justifications of the actions taken (See Table XIII). All of these characteristics o f Bush's
crisis rhetoric fit the requirements o f a genre listed above.
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Table XIII: Busies Dominant Argument Styles with Various Audiences
Factual

Descriptive

Press

15

2

Special Interest

5

18

National

0

4

Evidence of consummatory and / or justificatory language
For this portion of my research, I began with the framework of criteria outlined by
Cherwitz and Zagacki and Rasmussen to examine consummatory and justificatory
characteristics in Bush's crisis rhetoric. Cherwitz and Zagacki state that consummatory
rhetoric is used when no military action has been taken and the president is trying to
solve the crisis through economic or diplomatic means. They describe justificatory
rhetoric as announcing military action. Rasmussen adds that justificatory arguments
center around the perceptions that U.S. action is in accordance with foreign policy goals
and that the action taken is morally upright, strategically sound and is likely to be
successful in response to enemy action. She also states that part of the success o f such
rhetoric in gaining public support for government action is based on the ability o f the
speaker to transfer the action to the public's accepted values. I have chosen to examine
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Rasmussen's additional characteristics later in this chapter, and begin with the issue of
justificatory versus consummatory rhetoric in terms o f military versus domestic action
In my research, I found that when Bush discussed military and diplomatic actions
in his crisis rhetoric, he did include the consummatory and justificatory characteristics
defined by Cherwitz and Zagacki and Rasmussen. However, their research suggests that
crisis rhetoric can be clearly distinguished as either consummatory or justificatory, but I
found that most of George Bush's speeches during the crises studied were a blend of both
types of language. Table XIY illustrates the breakdown o f his speeches into three
categories: l)consummatory with no justificatory references to military action; 2)
justificatory with no consummatory references to diplomatic or economic action; 3)
"blended," speeches containing consummatory and justificatory rhetoric. 33

Table XIV: Breakdown of Consummatory, Justificatory and Blended Speeches
Panama

Persian Gulf

Invasion

Los Angeles

Flag

Riots

Desecration

Consummatory

0

4

5

2

Justificatory

3

0

2

0

Blended

5

10

12

1
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Ten of the fourteen speeches Bush delivered concerning the Persian Gulf crisis
were a blend of consummatory and justificatory language. My research o f the four week
time period surrounding the Persian Gulf crisis revealed that Bush never delivered a
speech concerning military action without including some discourse about diplomatic and
economic action By the same token, during the time period studied, Bush never gave a
totally consummatory speech concerning the Panama Invasion crisis. Five of his eight
speeches during that crisis were blended. This blending of consummatory and
justificatory rhetoric was also present in Bush’s domestic crisis rhetoric. During the Los
Angeles riots crisis, twelve of his nineteen speeches were blended. Overall, 28 o f the 44
speeches studied were not exclusively consummatory or justificatory (See Table XIV).
Those blended speeches all contained some comments on diplomatic and economic
efforts being taken to avert, relieve or defuse the crisis and in all o f them, Bush still
mentioned the role of military force.
For example, in Bush's announcement of the Panama Invasion, which was
justificatory rhetoric, his remarks included consummatory language offering the promise
of a U.S.-Panama partnership (1989, 1723). Bush used this one speech to announce
military action and to make a consummatory offer of diplomatic action. In another blend
o f consummatory and justificatory rhetoric, one week after the invasion, Bush announced
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that he would be sending a military reconstruction task force to Panama (1989, 1739).
This was an announcement of a consummatory action -- reconstruction —that he had
ordered to be performed by military troops.
During the Persian Gulf crisis, there were many speeches during which Bush
blended consummatory and justificatory rhetoric. For example, in his remarks on August
2 concerning the Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait, one week before his deployment o f U.S.
troops, Bush listed diplomatic and economic actions being taken such as the call for an
emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, an Executive order freezing
Iraqi assets and a call for global condemnation. All of these announcements fit the
definition of consummatory rhetoric. However, in the same speech Bush laid the
groundwork for military action, stating, We remain committed to take whatever steps are
necessary to defend our long-standing, vital interests in the Gulf' (1990, 1083-4).
Although this was not an announcement o f military action, it was justificatory in nature,
referring to the potential for military involvement.
Consummatory and justificatory rhetoric received equal exposure in a speech on
August 5 when Bush told the press, "I just wanted to fill you in on all the diplomatic
activity that is taking place" (1990, 1100-1). In the same speech he informed them that
he was meeting at Camp David with top military people (1990, 1101). These remarks
sent a clear message to his audience that he was making decisions about both diplomatic
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and military actions concerning the crisis situation. By using both consummatory and
justificatory rhetoric during this crisis, Bush was able to notify the public about all the
options being considered for resolution of the crisis and meet their expectations for
information about the situation.
After Bush took military action in the Persian Gulf, his consummatory and
justificatory rhetoric became virtually indistinguishable as he described the use of
military troops to perform consummatory actions. For example, in his address to the
nation on August 8 he spoke about the role o f the military in enforcing economic
embargo and global sanctions (1990, 1109). In other words, the military action taken
(justificatory) was, in fact, in support of economic actions being taken (consummatory).34
Two weeks after the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush stated, "As the
deployment o f the forces o f the many nations shows (justificatory) and as the votes in the
United Nations show (consummatory)..." (1990, 1157-8). By including both justificatory
and consummatory statements in one sentence, Bush seemed to offer something for
everyone —actions for those who wanted to support military involvement and actions for
those who wanted to support diplomatic approaches to the crisis. These speeches allowed
him to assure the public that he was doing everything possible to avoid escalation o f
military action, but at the same time, he was alerting the enemy and assuring the public
that he was prepared to take military action to resolve the crisis. As a characteristic o f
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crisis rhetoric genre, this blend of consummatory and justificatory language is valuable in
addressing the widespread views of a global audience and helping them understand the
options available to the president in dealing with a crisis situation.
Bush's blend o f consummatory and justificatory rhetoric was not limited to
international crises. In his address to the nation on May 1, 1992, concerning the Los
Angeles riots, Bush devoted half of the speech to information on the military troops who
had been dispatched to Los Angeles. In fact, his announcement o f the use of military
troops was quite similar to those announcements during international crises. He
described the conditions that required military involvement, "4,000 fires, staggering
property damage, hundreds of injuries, and the senseless deaths..." (1992, 685). He then
explained what action had been taken, "I've ordered the Justice Department to dispatch
1,000 Federal riot-trained law enforcement officials to help restore order in Los Angeles"
(1992, 685). The other half of the speech centered around diplomatic efforts to assure
civil rights leaders that the Federal government was taking action "...to ensure that justice
is served" (1992, 685). As in the two international crisis studied, Bush blended his
consummatory and justificatory crisis rhetoric to assure his audiences that as their leader,
he was taking both diplomatic and military actions concerning the situation.
Bush's remarks concerning the Flag Desecration crisis were primarily
consummatory, centering on legislative action to resolve the crisis. However, he did
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include military references in his remarks during this crisis. For example, he used
justificatory language when he related a story of a soldier who was killed in battle and
stated, "If the debate here is about liberty, then we cannot turn our backs on those who
fought to win it for us" (1989, 832). So even during this domestic crisis which involved
no announcement o f military action, military references were a part o f George Bush's
blended crisis rhetoric.
These examples provide evidence that Bush used a combination o f both
consummatory and justificatory language to persuade the public to support his chosen
courses of action during crisis situations. Cherwitz and Zagacki and Rasmussen used the
differences between consummatory and justificatory rhetoric to support their genre
argument. I suggest that their criteria are too narrow to be useful in a genre definition.
Bush's speeches support my argument that crisis rhetoric includes both consummatory
and justificatory language, and in terms of defining the genre, the presence o f either one,
or both types of language meets the requirements of the genre.

Speaker indicates awareness of global audience
Types of audiences being addressed is another criterion proposed by Cherwitz and
Zagacki and Rasmussen that is too narrow for a crisis rhetoric genre definition. They link
their audience types to a distinction between consummatory and justificatory rhetoric by
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stating that in justificatory rhetoric the primary audiences are the American public and the
instigators o f the crisis whereas in consummatory rhetoric the speaker is addressing a
global audience. However this distinction is too limiting and does not contribute to a
useful definition of crisis rhetoric. Because of modem communication technology,
presidents must always be aware that they are addressing global audiences, and my
analysis o f Bush's crisis rhetoric supports the argument that he was aware o f that
audience.
During the Panama Invasion crisis, Bush did address United States population as
his primary audience and clearly identified Noriega as the instigator of the crisis.
However, his awareness of his global audience was evident as he went on to thank the
Latin American countries and U.S. allies for their support of his actions (1989, 1728). In
another statement that illustrated how Bush extended the boundaries of his audience,
Bush stated, "At the beginning o f the term35, there were still three holdout dictatorships in
Latin America. And thanks to the sacrifice and the courage of our American fighting
men, today there are only two" (1990, 4). These remarks were directed at the Latin
American population ~ a global audience —as much as to the United States population.
They suggested a warning to the two remaining dictatorships and perhaps even a preview
o f future presidential action.
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During the Persian Gulf crisis, Bush identified Saddam Hussein as the instigator
and the American people were his primary audience, but once again, he took every
opportunity to expand his remarks to include a global audience. In his news conference
two weeks after the deployment of troops, Bush said, "...this is not a matter between Iraq
and the United States of America; it is between Iraq and the entire world community"
(1990, 1158). This was just one of many statements during the Persian Gulf crisis in
which Bush directed his remarks to a global audience.
Like the international crises studied, Bush's speeches during domestic crises were
directed primarily to the American public. His first remarks on the crisis in Los Angeles
were, "I urge all Americans to approach this situation with calm" (1992, 669) and
"Tonight I call on every American to show restraint and to respect people's rights and
property." However, even in this domestic crisis situation, Bush took advantage of
opportunities to raise the crisis to a global level and speak to a global audience. For
example, when he spoke to leaders of the Korean community whose businesses were
vandalized during the rioting he said, "I will do everything I can to show our friends
abroad as well as here that it's not the American way" (1992, 719). This statement was for
the benefit o f his global audience, not the American audience immediately present. In
another example of Bush's efforts to give the crisis a global perspective, he said in his
remarks to Los Angeles community leaders on May 8, "everyone around the world feels
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this trauma, everyone who looks to us as a model of freedom and justice" (1992, 730).
As these remarks illustrate, although Bush's primary audience appeared to be the
American people, his language revealed his awareness of his global audience. Even
during the Flag Desecration crisis, Bush spoke to a global audience, promising to "protect
civil rights here and democracy abroad" (1989, 832). While this may not have been a
particularly powerful statement to his non-American audience, Bush's words illustrate
that he was clearly aware of his global audience. With today's highly technological
communication network, categorizing crisis rhetoric based on a domestic or global
audience is outdated. Remarks concerning any issue may be directed primarily to the
domestic public, but there will always be the potential for a global audience. George
Bush's discourse supports the argument that crisis rhetoric as a genre must be prepared
with a global audience in mind.

Explanation of how action is in accordance with U.S. policy
Crisis communication must include an explanation of how the actions taken by
the president was in accordance with U.S. policy. In seeking public support of his actions
during both international and domestic crises, Bush's rhetoric was characterized by lists
o f goals that were in concert with U.S. policy. For example, Bush's stated goals o f the
Panama Invasion were to safeguard American lives, defend democracy, combat drug
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trafficking and protect the Panama Canal treaty (1989, 1723). On December 21, as the
invasion was in its second day, Bush reported on progress achieved toward those goals.
Matching his remarks to his originally stated goals, he announced that the military had
neutralized the enemy, provided a stable environment for the new government, ensured
the integrity o f the canal and created a safe environment for American citizens in Panama
(1989, 1729). Each action was in support o f a stated policy goal o f the U.S. Bush
consistently used his crisis rhetoric to reiterate U.S. policy goals and explain what actions
had been taken in accordance with those goals. This type o f communication during a
crisis helps audiences understand what decisions are being made by the president and
why.
In Bush's address to the nation on the Persian Gulf crisis on August 8, 1990 he
listed the goals of that military action, stating, "Four simple principles guide our policy.
First we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal o f all Iraqi forces
from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the
puppet regime. And third, my administration...is committed to the security and stability
o f the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to protect the lives o f American citizens
abroad." (1990, 1108, 1138). As he did during the Panama Invasion crisis, Bush restated
these goals often during the crisis and his remarks in subsequent speeches reflected the
progress achieved in meeting those specific goals.
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During the Los Angeles crisis, Bush also used his rhetoric to demonstrate that his
actions were in accordance with U.S. policy. His justification for using military troops in
Los Angeles was to restore law and order, which can be described as a domestic U.S.
policy. He stated that policy in his address to the nation on May 1, 1992, when he said,
"The Federal effort in this case...will not be driven by mob violence but by respect
for...the rule of law" (1992, 686). In other words, he would take federal action in order to
further the U.S. policy of law and order. When Bush arrived in Los Angeles after calm
had been restored, he told military personnel and local law enforcement personnel and
firefighters, "your very presence restored a sense o f civility" and he praised them for
"restoring the peace" (1992, 727-9). Bush's remarks were designed to emphasize the
effectiveness o f the military action in supporting the government policy o f law and order
by restoring domestic tranquillity in Los Angeles.
As these examples illustrate, during both international and domestic crisis
situations, Bush clearly stated goals o f U.S. policy and explained how they were
supported by his chosen actions. This characteristic of crisis communication exhibited by
Bush supports the argument that crisis rhetoric describes actions taken as in accordance
with U.S. policy.
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Explanation of how action is strategically sound and morally upright
Another characteristic of crisis rhetoric is that the action should be perceived by
the audience as morally upright and strategically advantageous (Rasmussen 113). Bush
spoke with ease about military strategy and used this ability to strengthen his arguments
concerning the actions taken. In addition, considering Bush's strong focus on values, it is
not surprising that his rhetoric contained language defending the morality o f his actions.
Strategic advantage during the Panama Invasion was the focus of Bush's rhetoric.
In his remarks to the press on December 31,1989, he applauded the military invasion
strategy, stating, "...in a military sense, everything I've heard is that the operation, though
some were desperately hurt and some regrettably killed, was a superb operation" (1989,
1751) This statement offered assurances to the audience concerning the strategic
correctness o f the actions taken. However, Bush's reference to those who were injured
and killed was somewhat cold-blooded and did not support his assertion that "The United
States used its resources in a manner consistent with political, diplomatic and moral
principles" (1990, 8). As was discussed in Chapter 3, Bush had some difficulty
expressing sympathy in his crisis rhetoric and these two statements illustrate how that
weakness may have sent a message o f insincerity to his audience.
Military strategy was also central to Bush's remarks during the Persian Gulf crisis,
but during that situation he was more effective in assuring his audience that the actions
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taken were morally upright. Bush began to build support for the strategic and moral
value of military action one week before he deployed U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia.
During his remarks at the Aspen Institute on August 2, Bush stressed the moral
responsibility o f the U.S. and the strategic threat to U.S. interests, stating:

Even in a world where democracy and freedom have made great gains,
threats remain. Terrorism, hostagetaking, renegade regimes and
unpredictable rulers, new sources of instability —all require a strong and
an engaged America.
The brutal aggression launched last night against Kuwait illustrates
my central thesis: Notwithstanding the alteration in the Soviet threat, the
world remains a dangerous place with serious threats to important U.S.
interests. (1990, 1092).

These remarks were a broadly based assessment of the various immoral forces and
unidentified aggressors that the U.S. must be prepared to face. By making these
statements, and using Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as simply one example, Bush was setting
the tone for potential U.S. involvement, informing his audiences about the moral and
strategic threats against which he was preparing to take action.
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One week later, in his address to the nation announcing the deployment o f troops
to Saudi Arabia, Bush clearly defined the moral standings of the two adversaries —
Hussein vs. the rest o f the world, when he said, "Iraqi Armed Forces, without provocation
or warning, invaded a peaceful Kuwait...Facing negligible resistance from its much
smaller neighbor, Iraq's tanks stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait..." (1990,
1107). On the other side were the United Nations sanctions "...enshrined in international
law..." (1990, 1108). These remarks clearly established the actions of the U.S. and its
allies as taking the highest moral ground. "Enshrined" carries a connotation of holiness.
In contrast, Bush equated Iraq with the most barbaric behavior in modem history -- the
blitzkrieg methods of the Nazis.
Bush spoke of America's international moral responsibility when he addressed
Republican supporters at a fundraising luncheon in Rhode Island, stating, "we must be
guided by the imperatives of a strong moral compass" (1990, 1154). He justified his
actions in the Gulf, emphasizing the moral struggle that was part o f his decision made
"...not with passionate haste [but] with a heavy heart...not out of some national hunger for
conflict but out o f moral responsibility" (1990,1154). These remarks clearly met the
requirements of the genre definition —that the actions taken were morally upright.
During domestic crises, Bush also used his rhetoric to argue that his actions as
president were morally upright and strategically advantageous. Evidently pleased with
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the strategic results of government action in Los Angeles, Bush told an audience on May
13, "I think the Nation is focusing on how well all levels of government came to bear on
helping in the recovery and the re-stimulation of the community there in Los Angeles"
(1992, 758). Even though there was no invasion, Bush still found the language necessary
to illustrate that restoring law and order and rebuilding Los Angeles was a well-planned,
well-executed strategic government operation.
During both domestic and international crisis situations, Bush used language that
helped him assure his audiences of the moral uprightness and strategic correctness o f his
actions, thus fulfilling a characteristic requirement of crisis rhetoric as a genre. In
addition, creating this positive frame o f mind could naturally lead his audiences to
transfer the government's action to accepted social values, another important factor in
establishing public support for the chosen action and another characteristic o f the genre.

Justification of action includes references to widely accepted values o f audience
In Chapter 3 ,1 discussed at length Bush's use of values-based rhetoric to establish
common ground with his audiences. It was the very essence of his crisis communication
style to justify the action taken in terms of the values of his audiences. He used a wide
variety o f values with great skill. Whether he was basing his statements on patriotic
values, social values, family values, humanitarian values or religious values, he seemed to
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know just the right mix for his different audiences. In addition to the examples o f Bush's
rhetorical use of values offered in Chapter 3 ,1 found the following statements provide
further insight into Bush's values-based rhetoric and how it supports the genre argument.
The Flag Desecration crisis provided an interesting example of Bush's use of
crisis rhetoric to transfer his action to the widely accepted values of the audience. In his
call for a constitutional amendment, he incorporated several values, including patriotism,
liberty, free speech, civil rights and democracy (1989, 832) into two symbolic references
—the Iwo Jima Memorial and the flag itself. When Bush delivered his speech in front o f
the Iwo Jima Memorial, "the most famous image o f World War II," this was a direct
transfer o f his action to the patriotic values o f World War II (1989, 832). Then, with a
poetic flair, Bush stated, "To the touch, this flag is merely fabric. But to the heart, this
flag represents and reflects the fabric of our nation" (1989, 832). Drawing attention to the
values represented by these powerful symbols, George Bush clearly linked his call for
protection o f the flag with basic patriotic values held by many Americans.
Another interesting use of values-based remarks was during the Los Angeles riots
crisis when Bush said, "We are embarrassed by interracial violence and prejudice. We
are ashamed" (1992, 715). By touching the raw nerves o f racial intolerance, Bush created
a link between the social values of humanity, equality and civil rights and the actions
taken to uphold those values. In addition, when Bush said "We are ashamed," he added a
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tone of religious value to the rhetorical mix and joined his fellow Americans in taking
responsibility for the damaged state of America's values system which allowed this crisis
to occur. Once he had identified the values related to this crisis situation, he detailed the
actions he was taking, such as meetings with community leaders, to restore that value
system.
One of the best examples of Bush's transfer of his actions to the values of his
audience was a speech to Los Angeles community leaders during which he wrapped all
the values he had discussed in previous Los Angeles speeches into one package and then
used his political agenda to link his actions to those values. Referring to such values as
civil rights, freedom, democracy, and family and religious values, Bush denounced
existing social service programs and promoted his own agenda o f social reform. After a
lengthy speech outlining his action plan, Bush summed up his arguments:

From now on in America, any definition o f a successful life must include
serving others ... we remain the freest and the fairest and the most just and
the most decent country on the face of the entire Earth ... in good
communities...young people are cared for, and they're instilled with
character and values and good habits for life (1992, 733).
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This series of remarks was a passionate appeal to widely accepted values of American
society, including patriotism, civil rights, brotherhood and democracy. Bush's delivery of
these remarks reminded me o f the finale in a fireworks display when the presenters throw
in everything they have and literally take the audience's breath away. There is nothing
left to do but applaud.
Throughout this thesis, Bush's use of values to build audience support was evident
and masterful. He knew how to defend his chosen actions in terms o f social, patriotic and
religious values and, whether the crisis was domestic or international, whether the actions
were military or diplomatic, he knew which values would be most effective with which
audiences. Certainly, Bush's speeches support the argument that a characteristic o f crisis
rhetoric as a genre is the justification of action through references to widely accepted
values.

Evidence of enemy them es
Rasmussen included enemy themes as one characteristic o f justificatory rhetoric,
but she specified that such language referred to the Communist enemy. I found examples
o f enemy themes in 36 o f Bush's 44 crisis speeches examined, but none were based on
Communism as the enemy (See Table XV).
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Table XV: Use of Enemy Themes in Bush's Crisis Rhetoric
Total number of speeches

Speeches with enemy themes

Flag Desecration

3

1

Panama

8

8

Persian Gulf

14

12

Los Angeles

19

15

Invasion

Riots

Once again, Rasmussen’s criteria are too narrow for a useful definition o f crisis
rhetoric genre. During Bush’s administration, the Communist Soviet Union collapsed,
losing its global power and posing little threat to the United States. By limiting her
criterion to a Communist enemy theme, Rasmussen's genre definition was only applicable
for about 80 years. Certainly, presidents have needed to identify enemies in crisis
rhetoric prior to the rise of Communism in the early 1900's and will continue to do so in
the future. In fact, Communism may regain its strength somewhere in the world and once
again pose a major threat. In such a case, Communism will likely be the enemy theme in
some future president's crisis rhetoric, but for the genre definition to be useful to speakers
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and audiences, it must include enemy themes as a broad characteristic that can be applied
to any language referring to anyone or any ideology that threatens the United States.
During the crises studied, Bush identified specific individuals, certain behaviors
and even social climates as enemies. Enemy themes during the international crises
focused on Noriega and Hussein, specific individuals whom Bush targeted as the
instigators o f the crisis. During the domestic crises, Bush did not identify individuals as
enemies. Instead he referred to faceless enemies such as "mobs" and "protesters."
During the Panama Invasion crisis, there was one enemy —Manuel Noriega, and
Bush identified him as "an indicted drug trafficker" (1989, 1723) and a "gang leader"
who, as a national leader, ordered his forces to shoot, kill, beat and sexually abuse
unarmed Americans (1989, 1723). Bush singled out Noriega as a common criminal
making the violent acts carried out under his orders sound more like inner city violence
than the acts o f a nation at war with the U.S.. During the days after the invasion, Bush
began to talk about bringing Noriega " to justice for poisoning the children of the United
States of America and the people of the world" (1989, 1744). It was easy for Bush to
identify the enemy in the Panama Invasion crisis and he took full advantage of that to
build support for his actions against such a despicable enemy.
During the Persian Gulf crisis, Bush again was able to identify a specific enemy in
Saddam Hussein. However, he did not do so in his early remarks -- he began by
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condemning aggressive behavior as the enemy. For example, during the week prior to his
deployment of U.S. troops, Bush referred only to "naked aggression" by Iraq (1990, 1083,
1085, 1089, 1098, 1101, 1106). Then, in his address to the nation on August 8, 1990
announcing the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush not only named Hussein as
the enemy, but likened him to the century's most heinous enemy, Adolf Hitler: "As was
the case in the 1930's we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his
neighbors" (1990, 1108).

36

This use o f enemy themes helped Bush build support for his

actions by defining a single enemy and assigning that enemy a label that would be most
abhorrent to the American people.
On August 15, in a speech to Department of Defense employees, Bush continued
to talk about the enemy, Saddam Hussein, "...the man who has used poison gas against
the men, women and children of his own country" (1990, 1138). Here, Bush was
describing Hussein not only as an enemy against the United States, but as an enemy
against his own people. In a rhetorical note of disdain, Bush referred to the enemy by his
first name, "Saddam...lied to his neighbors," "Saddam...invaded an Arab state,"
"...Saddam would have us believe," "Saddam has claimed..." (1990, 1138). By not using
his last name or title, but calling him simply "Saddam," Bush showed that Hussein was
not deserving o f any respect as the leader of a nation. In a statement that expressed the
enormity o f the evil this enemy could do, Bush stated, "Our jobs, our way of life, our own
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freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would suffer if control
of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of that one man, Saddam Hussein"
(1990, 1139). Bush created the image of a single enemy who could seemingly bring
down the world. In an interesting twist on the enemy theme in another speech, Bush
stated that by taking foreign hostages, Iraq had violated an "age-old Arab tradition of
showing kindness and hospitality to visitors" (1990, 1148). Thus, Hussein was the
enemy of civilized society throughout time. As a threat to the United States, to his own
Iraqi people, to world peace and to the traditions of Arab civility, Saddam Hussein
provided Bush with a great deal o f material for the enemy theme in his crisis rhetoric.
Unlike the crises in Panama or in the Persian Gulf, Bush did not have an
individual he could identify as the enemy instigator of the crisis in Los Angeles.
Nonetheless, he was able to use enemy themes in his domestic crisis rhetoric. In his
initial remarks, the violent crimes themselves were the enemy. Bush stated, "random
violence against innocent victims must be condemned" (1992, 669). This statement
defined "violence" as the enemy without identifying the people who might be instigators
o f the crisis. Bush also condemned "mob brutality" several times (1992, 671). The word
"mob" added human form to the enemy theme, but Bush remained ambiguous about the
faceless perpetrators o f the violence.
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The next day in his address to the nation, Bush began to put a face on the enemy - the face o f the American people. He said, "In a civilized society, there can be
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excuse...for the murder, arson, theft, and vandalism that have terrorized the law-abiding
citizens of Los Angeles...It's as if we were looking in a mirror that distorted our better
selves and turned us ugly." (1992, 686). With these words, the face of every American
became the face of the enemy. Bush had injected enemy themes into his crisis rhetoric
without naming any individuals or ideologies.
When he visited Los Angeles after the riots, Bush’s remarks concerning enemy
themes varied depending on his audience. In some cases, perhaps to defuse the situation,
he downplayed the enemy theme. For example, to the African-American community he
said, "This is not a time for blame" (1992, 714), and to the Los Angeles community
leaders he stated, "Casting blame gets us absolutely nowhere" (1992, 731). These
remarks were an attempt to acknowledge that someone or something was the enemy but
that Bush's agenda was to focus on rebuilding.
On the other hand, in his remarks to firefighters, law enforcement personnel and
military personnel, Bush used his strongest enemy theme language with such phrases as
"...people that would wantonly destroy, wantonly terrorize, wantonly kill their fellow
citizens" (1992, 727), and "...we've seen the worst that human beings can do" (1992, 728).
After Bush's visit to Los Angeles, he continued to name human, but faceless enemies

142
such as "gangs o f looters" and "angry mobs" (1992, 735). Bush was careful to avoid any
racial or socio-economic identifiers when describing the Los Angeles riots instigators, but
he spoke against those faceless people who participated in the violence knowing that they
were considered outside the boundaries o f acceptable society.
During the Flag Desecration crisis, Bush did not name an enemy, but he came
very close when he made reference to protesters, stating, "Flag-burning is wrong" (1989,
805). As was the case during the Los Angeles riots, the enemy here was faceless and
nameless. In effect, the enemy was a behavior -- flag-burning. Nonetheless, it meets the
definition o f an enemy theme. In addition, although the idea of an enemy theme may be
too strong in this case, Bush certainly established the existence o f an adversarial
relationship when he pitted himself against the Supreme Court on this issue.
Enemy themes were evident in Bush’s crisis rhetoric and are a necessary element
o f any speech during which presidents must inform the public about a crisis situation and
what actions are being taken. Enemy themes should be included as one of the
characteristics o f crisis rhetoric genre, defined as any reference to an individual, a group,
a behavior, a social climate or an ideology that contributes to or creates a crisis situation.
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Summary
My analysis o f George Bush's crisis rhetoric does suppurl the argument that
presidential crisis communication is a rhetorical genre with the following elements as the
genre criteria:
1. Consistent, identifiable pattern of language style and strategy. For George Bush, that
pattern was the use o f values based rhetoric to establish himself as the nation’s legitimate
leader and to establish common ground with his audiences.
2. Evidence o f consummatory and / or justificatory language
3. Speaker indicates awareness o f global audience
4. Explanation o f how action is in accordance with U.S. policy
5. Explanation o f how action is strategically sound and morally upright
6. Justification o f action is based on widely accepted values of audience
7. Evidence o f enemy themes
The first characteristic addresses the general definition o f a genre. The fourth,
fifth and sixth characteristics are basically unchanged from those presented in previous
communication research. However, the second, third and seventh elements
reflect several modifications o f the Cherwitz and Zagacki and Rasmussen's definitions of
the crisis rhetoric genre. First o f all, the speeches cannot be separated into consummatory
and justificatory categories. In fact, to separate these two language characteristics is
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counterproductive to the genre theory and is misleading for the political leader who
interprets the separation as a guideline for effective crisis coimnuiiication. Rather,
speeches should be examined for elements of both types of language. Bush consistently
blended the characteristics of consummatory and justificatory language in his speeches,
supporting the argument that the criterion o f Cherwitz and Zagacki and Rasmussen is too
limiting.
Another criterion that requires refining is the audience definition. With today's
world wide communication technology, the audience cannot be limited to the U.S. public
and it would be naive of any president to think otherwise. With modem communication
methods such as electronic media and satellite communication, decisions are
communicated with lightning speed and there is little control over the audiences o f those
messages. Every crisis communication is accessible to and evaluated by a global audience
during both international and domestic crisis situations. Therefore, every crisis speech
must cover a wide range of audiences, assuring them that both consummatory and
justificatory options are part o f every decision.
Finally, concerning the definition o f enemy themes, recent historical events
require the removal of references to the Communist enemy, which would only have been
applicable to crisis rhetoric delivered from the 1920's to the 1980's. Enemy themes in
presidential crisis communication prior to the 20th century would have had no references
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to Communism, but rather would have referred to the enemies of the time, and we have
no way of anticipating the enemies of the future. Enemy themes are an iniporlant
characteristic of presidential crisis communication, but the definition for the genre must
be broad enough to include any threat to the tranquillity of the United States. Enemy
themes should include any potential national threats, which may be individuals, nations
or ideologies. This may seem to be an issue o f semantics, but it is important to clarify the
criteria of enemy themes in order for political leaders to use the genre framework in
presenting their crisis messages to the public.
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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

When George Bush announced the deployment of troops to the Persian Gulf there
was very little protest from the American public. At the time, I found this somewhat
amazing considering that the U S. military action in Vietnam was still a hot topic o f
public debate. I felt sure that those who argued against the political actions that sent U.S.
troops to Vietnam would openly defy Bush's decision should he choose to send troops to
the Persian Gulf. However, much to my surprise, Bush accomplished that military action
with very little protest from the American public and, in fact, the action seemed generally
well received. I wondered how, in a national climate that seemed so strongly opposed to
sending the U.S. military into foreign conflicts, Bush was able to persuade the American
public to support his deployment of military troops in the Persian Gulf. Some answers to
this question were revealed in my rhetorical analysis o f George Bush's speeches delivered
during the Persian Gulf crisis and the other three crisis situations examined for this thesis
-- the Panama Invasion, the Los Angeles riots and the Flag Desecration crisis.
First o f all, Bush employed a very effective style and strategy that was based on
two rhetorical elements ~ his personal presence as the nation's leader and his ability to
tailor his remarks to his various audiences by building his arguments around widely
accepted values o f the American public. Second, he structured his remarks in a consistent
pattern that met the criteria of crisis rhetoric genre, which helped his audiences anticipate
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the focus o f his remarks, helped them understand the crisis situations, and helped them
relate the president's chosen actions to resolution of the crises.
This thesis offered an in-depth, detailed view o f George Bush's crisis rhetoric
which contributes to the body of communication research on presidential crisis
communication. However, George Bush's remarks during crisis situations tended to be
brief, direct and to the point, so it is fitting that an analysis o f his crisis rhetoric can be
summed up by examining just one brief sentence from a speech he delivered on the
morning o f December 20, 1989 following his ordered invasion o f Panama. "I want to tell
you what I did and why" (1989, 1722). These few words embodied the defining
characteristics o f George Bush's crisis rhetoric. Bush delivered factual information about
crisis situations with confidence. He used the word "I" three times, calling attention to
himself as the speaker and the nation's legitimate, competent leader. By using the word
"I" instead o f "we," he defined his role as president, emphasizing his personal
responsibility for the actions taken during the crisis. Certainly he supported his remarks
with references to credible sources —political and military officials, and leaders of other
nations —but the final decision was his, and his alone, as the President o f the United
States.
While Bush, the speaker, dominated the positioning o f his crisis rhetoric, values
dominated the content of his remarks. In the statement above, the single word "why" told
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George Bush's audience a great deal about what to expect from that speech. They knew
that when he told them the "why" o f his actions, the explanations would be in terms of
their values. They also knew that he was going to explain how the actions were
strategically sound in response to the actions of the enemy who instigated the crisis, and
he was going to explain how the actions were morally upright and in concert with U.S.
policies. Bush's crisis rhetoric was certainly more complex than this one brief statement
reveals, but his personal view o f his leadership role and his use o f values were the
common threads that dominated his crisis remarks.
However, Bush had a rhetorical weakness —speaking face-to-face with the
average citizen. This was most evident during his remarks concerning the Los Angeles
riots. Compare his national address from the Oval Office with his remarks to victims
when he visited the actual sites of the riots. When he addressed the nation, his delivery
was smooth, coherent, strong and full o f empathy for the victims. However, when he
faced the riot victims in the destroyed neighborhoods, he stumbled over words and failed
to express himself with compassion.
On the other hand, Bush's strongest rhetorical position was as a global leader.
Whenever possible, he enhanced his role as the nation's leader by presenting himself as a
global leader, and the wider his sphere of leadership, the more effective and confident
was his rhetoric.
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My study of Bush's style and strategy revealed a great deal of information about
George Bush as a speaker, but it also provided examples of language that helped create a
list of criteria for the crisis rhetoric genre. Rhetorical genre are important
communication tools for presidents and their audiences. Scholars have provided
presidents with guidelines for campaign speeches, keynote addresses, inaugural addresses
and eulogies that help the speaker and audience communicate with each other. Certainly
crisis rhetoric —the most critical communication between presidents and their publics —
should be included in this list.
The very nature o f crisis —unpredictable and ambiguous -- makes guidelines for
crisis communication difficult to develop, and it is likely that additional research will
result in ongoing redefinitions o f presidential crisis rhetoric criteria as scholars work
toward consensus on the genre theory. Nonetheless, generally accepted guidelines for
crisis communication are necessary to further its standing as a rhetorical genre, and
further study of other presidents' crisis rhetoric is necessary in order to clearly define it as
a rhetorical genre.
One of the questions addressed by this thesis was whether there were differences
between domestic and international presidential crisis rhetoric. The results o f the research
were that both Bush's domestic crisis rhetoric and international crisis rhetoric were
similar in style and strategy and supported the genre theory.
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Similarities in Bush's domestic and international crisis rhetoric included his
emphasis on his personal responsibility as the nation's leader, and the consistent structure
o f his remarks. In addition, his pattern of using widely accepted values to support his
actions was present in both types of rhetoric.
One clear difference between Bush's domestic rhetoric and international crisis
rhetoric had to do with identification o f enemies. During the international crises, he had
no problem naming specific individuals who were the instigators of the crisis. However,
during domestic crises he chose not to name any specific enemies. He talked in general
terms about types o f negative behaviors that were in opposition to American values, but
the domestic enemy was always faceless. In fact, for a president to attack specific
American citizens as enemies would contradict the values o f unity and brotherhood that
contribute to national stability. It would be interesting to study Abraham Lincoln's
speeches in terms o f enemy themes to see if, even when the American people were
bitterly fighting each other, he ever identified the enemy by name.
Another area o f comparison between domestic and international crisis rhetoric had
to do with the settings in which Bush delivered his remarks. Traditionally, presidents do
not visit the sites o f battlefields or rioting neighborhoods during crisis situations. It is
understandable that such on-site visits would put the president in harm's way and interfere
with his or her accessibility to the people and resources necessary to make crisis- related
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decisions. However, after the threat to the president's safety has passed, the feasibility of
an official visit is likely to be considered. During and immediately following the crises
studied for this thesis, Bush did not leave the United States. He traveled to military
hospitals in Texas to visit personnel who had been wounded in the Panama Invasion and
he traveled to Los Angeles to meet with residents and community leaders.
It is interesting to speculate on his motivation for those two visits. The Panama
Invasion was presented by Bush as a successful military endeavor and his visit to the
military site nearest to the crisis location may have strengthened his image as the leader
of the operation. George Bush's decision to visit Los Angeles following the riots was
probably influenced by the fact that he was in the midst o f a challenging presidential
campaign. Although, as was discussed previously, his rhetorical performance there was
occasionally weak, his presence enhanced his image as the nation's leader and the six
meetings he held with victims, public safety personnel and government leaders gave him
a platform for presenting his campaign agenda. Since Bush did leave Washington D.C.
in response to both an international and a domestic crisis, the question of whether
presidential travel decisions are influenced by the location o f the crisis remains
unanswered. Additional study would be useful to examine such questions as how much
time elapses between the return of order and the president's visit to the crisis site, and
whether a presidential visit to a crisis location enhances his or her leadership credibility.
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Overall, while this thesis did provide some information concerning the similarities
and differences between domestic and international crisis rhetoric, it was difficult to
make solid comparisons in many areas because the Flag Desecration crisis never
developed into a situation that threatened public safety. The potential for demonstrations
and even violence was a real possibility and, in fact, the debate over a Constitutional
amendment continues six years later. However, without the involvement o f military
action, it was difficult to compare and contrast President Bush's rhetoric during the Flag
Desecration crisis with his remarks during the other three crises. For example, I found
differences in terms of the values Bush emphasized in various speeches. During the
international crises, he stressed patriotic, democratic and humanitarian values, but during
the Los Angeles riots crisis, he built his arguments around family and religious values.
This variation in emphasis does not reflect a difference between domestic and
international crisis rhetoric because Bush did not draw on family or religious values
during the Flag Desecration crisis, but additional study of other domestic crises involving
violence would provide comparable discourse for a study o f those values that dominate
international crises and those that dominate domestic crises. While the four crises studied
for this thesis met the criteria as established in Chapter 2, future research should focus on
crisis situations that are comparable in terms of the threat to public safety and need for
military action.
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Future study
This thesis contributed to the body o f communication literature by providing
insight into the rhetorical style of President George Bush and at the same time, offering a
framework for similar analysis of other presidents. Additionally, I have suggested
specific criteria for a definition of the genre and broadened the scope of crisis
communication research by including domestic crises in my analysis. However, like
most communication research, my study raises many new questions. While I disagree
with Dow (307) who suggests that presidential crisis communication cannot be identified
as a genre until every presidential speech has been examined by rhetorical scholars, I do
suggest that further study of other presidents' crisis rhetoric is necessary in order to
clearly define the elements of this rhetorical genre. One particular area that warrants
additional study is the genre characteristic o f a consistent, identifiable pattern o f language
style and strategy. Further study is necessary to determine if Bush’s own pattern —the use
o f values based rhetoric to establish himself as the nation’s legitimate leader and to
establish common ground with his audiences —is the pattern common to all presidential
crisis rhetoric. If not, the genre definition must be a broad statement requiring a pattern
that may be unique to each president but which is consistent and identifiable for that
president. In addition, it might be interesting to examine presidential crisis
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communication by eras to determine if presidents in the early decades of our nation did,
in fact, speak exclusively in consummatory or justificatory style, depending on what
action had been taken. If so, such research could help define when modem presidential
crisis communication —the blending of consummatory and justificatory rhetoric -- came
about.
Additional studies in the area o f presidential crisis communication style and
strategy would benefit from a more narrow focus that addressed each of Hart's rhetorical
situation elements for several different presidents. For example, future analysis of the
element o f speaker could include a comparison of those presidents who predominantly
used the pronoun "I" versus those who chose the word "we" when justifying their
decisions. Such research could help identify which is more commonly used by presidents
to establish their legitimacy as the nation's leaders.
In terms of the element of audience, agenda setting studies could provide valuable
information about the persuasiveness of various crisis rhetoric styles and strategies. In
fact, it was very difficult to analyze George Bush's crisis rhetoric without drawing
conclusions about its effectiveness in terms o f public opinion. I believe it is a valuable
and essential first step of rhetorical analysis to examine the rhetoric itself, and this thesis
provides a useful framework for that study. However, in studying a president's crisis
communication, its effectiveness can best be measured in terms of public response to the
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rhetoric. Therefore, it follows that additional study in the area o f presidential crisis
communication must include such areas as public opinion patterns during a given crisis
and agenda setting patterns by the media in order to identify what strategies, styles and
characteristics o f crisis rhetoric are most effective in persuading the public to support the
president.
When George Bush said to the American public, “I want to tell you what I did and
why,” he alerted his audience to the style and general content o f his remarks. He
followed the crisis communication script that audiences were familiar with, thus making
it easier for them to understand and evaluate his chosen actions. He usually met the
demands o f Bitzer’s rhetorical situation, presenting discourse that was a fitting response
for each situation, and he apparently chose an effective rhetorical style and strategy. As a
result, President George Bush was generally able to persuade his audiences to support his
actions during crisis situations. Future research into presidential discourse, which
addresses the issues o f rhetorical style and strategy, and the crisis communication genre
theory, will provide communication scholars with additional insight into this important
aspect of presidential rhetoric.
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APPENDIX A
Elements of a rhetorical situation as illustrated by Roderick P. Hart in M odem Rhetorical
Criticism (71k

Audience

Medium

Cultural Boundary
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APPENDIX B
Released on Thursday, December 9, 1993 by the Times Mirror Center for the People and
the Press.

TIMES MIRROR DATABASE
PUBLIC ATTENTIVENESS TO MAJOR NEWS STORIES
(1986 - 1993 )
PERCENT FOLLOWED
VERY CLOSELY

80

Explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger (July 86)

73
70

Destruction caused by the San Francisco earthquake (Nov 69)
Verdict in Rodney King case and following riots and disturbances (May 92)

69
67
66
66
65
63
63
62
62
60
60

Uttle girl in Texas who was rescued after falling into a well (Oct 87)
War's end and the homecoming of U.S. forces from the Gulf (March 91)
Hurricane Andrew (Sept 92)
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia (Aug 90)
The Floods in the Midwest (Aug 93)
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf (Oct 90)
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf (Sept 90)
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the presence of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf (Nov 90)
Recent increases in the price of gasoline (Oct 90) '
Invasion of Panama (Jan 90)
Destruction caused by Hurricane Hugo (Oct 89)

59
58
57
57
56
53
52
52
51
51
50
50
50

Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the presence of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf (Jan 91)
U.S. air strikes against Libya (July 86)
The plight of the American hostages and other Westerners detained in Iraq (Sept 90)
Recent increase in the price of gasoline (Aug 90)
Recent increases in the price of gasoline (Sept 90)
Crash of a United Airlines DC-10 in Sioux City, Iowa (Aug 89)
Deployment of U.S. Forces to Somalia (Jan 93)
Alaska Oil Spill (May 89)
The release of American hostages and other westerners from Iraq and Kuwait (Jan 91)
Supreme Court decision of flag burning (July 89)
Waco, Texas Incident (May 93)
Opening of the Berlin Wall between East and West Germany (Nov 89)
Flight of the space shuttle (Oct 88)
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Table XVI: Breakdown of White House communications for crises studied
Supreme Court Decision on Flag Burning: June 21,1989
Window of study: June 7,1989 - July 5,1989
Total White House Communications

121

Communications related to crisis

7

Bush’s oral communications related to crisis

3

Panama Invasion: December 20,1989
Window of study: December 6,1989 - January 3,1990
Total White House Communications

92

Communications related to crisis

20

Bush’s oral communications related to crisis

8

Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf: August 8,1990
Window of study: July 25,1990 - August 22,1990
Total White House Communications

73

Communications related to crisis

34

Bush's oral communications related to crisis

14

Los Angeles Riots Following Rodney King Verdict: April 29, 1992
Window of study: April 15,1992 - May 13,1992
Total White House Communications

124

Communications related to crisis

23

Bush's oral communications related to crisis

19

37
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Table XVII: Data on Bush’s rhetoric during Flag Burning crisis
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Table XVIII: Data on Bush’s rhetoric during Panama Invasion crisis

Reasons for invasion,
military action

Main focus of speech

N ational
Restate goals, report on
military activity

A udience

White House Oval
Office
Press

L ocation

7:20 a.m.
White House
Briefing Room

Time of d ay

2:58 p.m.

Both

Justificatory

Justificatory

B rief
D escriptive

Both

D escriptive

B rief

AIDS research

Thanks, praise for party
support

Justificatory

Press
Invited Guests

Praise for soldiers
wounded in Panama and
medical professionals

D escriptive

Both

Special Interest

Press

Agenda of the R epublican
Party

B rief

Clinical Center

Bee County
Coliseum

Special Interest

Closure on invasion

12:34 p.m.

5:25 p.m.
Beach Pavilion,
Brook Army
Medical Center,
Fort Sam H ouston

Press

Naval Air Station

12:30 p.m.

Sate Dining
Room, Capitol
Hill Club

C/3

C/D
C
3

C
CD
/3

10:08 a.m.

2:50 p.m.

White House
Briefing Room
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C
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C
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Nd
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Praise troops, plans for
reconstruction

9:40 p.m.

e
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Time of day
8:05 a.m.
2:10 p.m.

3:35 p.m.
3:15 p.m.

Location
U.S. response

n.

Table XIX: Data on Bush’s rhetoric during Persian Gulf crisis

Press
Global diplomatic
response to Iraqi invasion

Main focus of speech

Press

Audience

Special Interest,
Invited Guests
Press
Press
Press

National
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White House Oval
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White House
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Outside the
residence of
Henry Catto,
United States.
Ambassador to the
United Kingdom
Music Tent at the
Aspen Institute
White House
South Lawn
White House
South Lawn
White House
Colonnade

9:00 a.m.

Budget deficit

ao
ca

Restructuring of post-cold
war U.S. defenses
Global sanctions against
Iraq
Global diplomatic
response to Iraqi invasion
Global cooperation to
enforce sanctions against
Iraq
Reasons for deployment;
details of military,
economic and diplomatic
actions
NATO coooperation in
Gulf

Press

Global cooperation in Gulf

B

Press

Special Interest

3

3:57 p.m.

1:35 p.m.

4:19 p.m.

Walker's Point,
the President's
home in
Kennebunkport,
Maine
White House
Briefing Room
River Entrance to
the Pentagon
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Table XX: Data on Bush’s rhetoric during Los Angeles Riots crisis

CO
•o

©

-J

o

164
oo
K>
N>
T3

T3

C
L

a*
a . B.

o.

O 3©"
n. oo

Q.

oo

TcJ

o.
"a
o c

3 ©:

cr

■a

Q. 3 oro

Q.

00

■©
8o "a

00

oo

o.

Q.

■a

o.

■a

o.

■o
■a

era
■a

■a

■a

■a

■a

■a

Table XX continued: Data on Bush’s rhetoric during Los Angeles Riots crisis

>
©
Cl n

165

NOTES

1. Richard E. Vatz argues that an event is not an exigence unless the rhetor chooses to
make it so for the audience. Taking the theory to the extreme, he suggests that there are
an infinite number of events in nature and rhetors create exigencies from those events
they choose to talk about.

2. Young 289, Farrell 272, and Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle 59 all
presented this viewpoint.

3. In the Forward of The Modem Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric. Robert E. Denton
discusses the American public notion o f presidents as wise decision makers, "...a
combination of Washington and Lincoln..." (xi).

4. See for instance, Ivie, Presidential Motives 341-343 and Images o f Savagery 291,
Rushing 418.

5. Amos Kiew's introduction to The Modem Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric contains
arguments very similar to those which I have presented in this thesis because we are both
commenting on research from the same scholars of presidential crisis rhetoric. Although
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many o f my statements are remarkably similar to his, 1 drew my conclusions
independently of his writings, based on my own review of the literature which I
conducted prior to the publication of his book. However, in the interests of presenting the
most complete review o f literature possible, I have incorporated relevant references from
Kiew's book into my thesis. References to public expectations of presidential rhetoric in
crises and the power o f crisis rhetoric to define reality in a crisis can be found on pages
xvi, xvii, xxiv and xxv

6. Metaphors are part of the rhetorical strategy o f jeremiads and are often presented in the
form o f fantasy types -- scenarios of conspiracy. Bormann’s research, cited in this thesis,
provides more detail about the blending of jeremiads and fantasy types.

7. Carole Blair and Davis W. Houck present arguments on the issue of genre that relate to
the definition o f "genre" itself. These arguments go beyond the scope I have outlined for
this thesis, but are valuable to consider in a study that focuses solely on the issue o f genre
(Kiewe, 98-100).

8. For more information about the effects o f television on political discourse, see for
instance Eloquence in an Electronic Age by Kathleen Hall Jamieson.
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9. See, for example, Rhetorical Criticism. Hxploration and Practice by Sonja K. Foss,
Modem Rhetorical Criticism by Roderick P. Hart, and Methods of Rhetorical Criticism, a
Twentieth-Centurv Perspective edited by Bernard L. Brock, Robert L. Scott and James W.
Chesebro.

10. Since 1986, Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press has maintained a database
that measures public attentiveness to major news stories. See Appendix B.

11. There were actually eight different news stories identified by the Time Mirror that were
followed very closely by more than fifty percent of the public. However, since all those
stories are about one crisis, I have chosen the August 8, 1990 date as the "peak" event o f the
crisis because that is the date on which President Bush deployed U.S. troops, taking the
crisis to its more uncertain and urgent level.

12. In Sound of Leadership, Hart uses seven different topic categories and a percentage
breakdown based on 25% and 75%. I used that model as a basis for determining whether
the crisis was the primary topic of the speech.

13.During 1989, the periodical's title was The Gallup Report. The 1990 and 1992 issues
were titled The Gallup Poll Monthly.
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14. Time and Newsweek magazines for June 12, 19, 26 and July 3, 1989 were examined.

15. Time and Newsweek for the weeks o f December 11, 18, 25, 1989 and January 1, 1990
were examined.

16. The highest rating was Kennedy's 83 percent during the Bay o f Pigs invasion in April
1961. The Gallup Poll Monthly, January, 1990,16.

17. Not included in this discussion of persuasive field because it appeared outside the fourweek window defined for this study, it is nevertheless interesting to note that the July 1990
issue of The Gallup Poll Monthly discussed the impact of the Panama Invasion on Bush's
approval rating and how it diminshed over time (2, 6).

18. The issues of Time and Newsweek for July 30 and August 6, 13 and 20, 1990 were
examined.

19. Iraq's aggressive posture was a crisis in the Persian Gulf for months before the crisis
point identified in this thesis —the deployment of U.S. troops. Therefore, unlike the
Panama Invasion crisis, one would have expected the news magazines to cover the issues,
which would ultimately lead to U.S. military involvement, during the weeks prior to the
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deployment of U.S. troops. Therefore, it was surprising that during the window of time
studied, there were no articles on the Persian Gulf crisis in the July 30 issues o f Newsweek
or Time. This raises an interesting agenda setting question for future research.

20. The Gallup Poll Monthly was examined for the months of July, August and September,
1990.

21. The issues of Time and Newsweek for April 20,27, May 4 and 11, 1992 were
examined.

22. The Gallup Poll Monthly for March, April and May of 1992 was examined.

23. This issue also included a great deal o f information comparing the presidential
candidates, and while that information may have contributed to the persuasive field, it was
too extensive to consider in detail for this thesis.

24. Since this is not an agenda setting study, any discussion of either print or broadcast
mass media is only included as appropriate to discussion of the elements o f audience, topic
and setting, or the arguments concerning genre in Chapter 4.
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25. McCroskey noted that sincerity and fluency may affect the public perception o f a
message ((73).

26. This is a standard question found in every issue of Gallup Poll Monthly that was
examined for this thesis.

27. Data for Tables V and VI were taken from Gallup Poll Monthly, September 1990,
pages 2 4 - 2 5 .

28. Since the function of the press is to relay the president's remarks to the public, it could
be said that every press conference had a national audience, but for clarity in this thesis, the
"audience" only refers to the primary audience who actually heard the president deliver his
remarks.

*

29. These remarks were delivered to Bush supporters at a barbeque and so, perhaps, he felt
he could speak more frankly to this clearly friendly audience than he might to reporters and
the nation. However, presidents must never forget that every official statement they make
can be picked up by the media and disseminated worldwide, thus reaching a much broader
group o f people than the primary audience.
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30. Bush's speeches concerning the Los Angeles riots addressed both his defense agenda
and his social and economic reforms agenda. Theese speeches were delivered during his reelection campaign and the circumstances of the crisis provided him with the opportunity to
promote both o f these political agendas.

31. The flag burning issue did not develop into an active crisis at a specific location. Bush
delivered remarks on the crisis during a speech at the New York Hilton Hotel and at the Iwo
Jima Memorial.

32. O f these five locations away from the White House, three sites -- The National Institute
o f Health in Bethesda, the Naval Air Station in Corpus Christi, and the Brook Army
Medical Center in Fort Sam Houston -- are government owned properties and gave Bush an
official Presidential backdrop off the grounds of the White House.

33. In some cases, the blended speeches were primarily consummatory with only brief
references to military action, and in other cases the consummatory and justificatory
references were more balanced, but within the confines o f this thesis, I have chosen to focus
on the issue o f Bush's blend of consummatory or justificatory references and not on how
predominantly consummatory or justificatory the speeches were.
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34. One of Bush's few speeches which was entirely consummatory was delivered the
afternoon of August 8, just over four hours after announcing the deployment of troops. In
those remarks to the press Bush only spoke about the cooperation of NATO members in
terms of economic actions taken (1990,1124).

35. Presumably he was referring to the beginning of his term as president.

36. Surprisingly, in remarks to the press later that same day, Bush did not use any enemy
themes in his remarks at all. His focus was limited to a discussion of NATO cooperation in
the Persian Gulf crisis. In his next public remarks on the crisis, August 14, Bush again
ommitted any enemy theme statements. In fact, the only reference to the crisis in that
speech on the federal budget was "Even while we address our critical international
obligations we must address that persistent, real need [the federal deficit]" (1990, 1130).

37. The following charts illustrate the frequency of Bush's crisis related remarks
concerning each crisis studied for this thesis. Each crisis is identified, followed by a date.
That date is the point when the crisis was at its peak as defined in Chapter 2. The
"Window of Study" refers to the time period from two weeks before the crisis to two
weeks after the crisis. The "Total White House Communications" includes all
communications published in the Public Papers of the President during the four week

173

time period examined for this thesis, including the President's oral remarks, his written
communications, remarks made by White House spokespersons, and official
appointments and nominations. "Communications related to crisis" is the number o f oral
and written communications including those made by the President and his
spokespersons. "Bush's oral communications related to crisis" includes only those
statements related to the crisis that were delivered orally by George Bush.
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